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“[A] lawyer should never fear prosecution because of advice that he 
or she has given to a client who consults him or her, and a client 
should never fear that its confidences will be divulged unless its pur-
pose in consulting the lawyer was for the purpose of committing a 
crime or a fraud.”1 
Judge Roger W. Titus 
INTRODUCTION 
The May 2011 trial of Lauren Stevens, the former Vice President 
and Associate General Counsel of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), ended in 
a judgment of acquittal before the defense called a single witness.2  
The government charged Stevens with obstruction of justice and false 
statements for failing to turn over allegedly incriminating documents 
in response to a voluntary request for information from the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in 2002.3  The FDA inquiry concerned 
whether GSK improperly promoted its FDA-approved depression 
drug, Wellbutrin, for an unapproved use—weight loss—in violation 
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.4  Judge Titus, who presided 
over Stevens’ trial, found that Stevens acted in good faith and on the 
reliance of counsel in her response to the FDA’s inquiry about 
Wellbutrin.5  Thus, Judge Titus held that a reasonable jury could not 
convict Stevens and granted her motion for a judgment of acquittal.6 
Members of the defense bar watched the case closely out of fear 
that a guilty verdict might hamper their ability to represent their cli-
ents zealously.  After Judge Titus’ ruling, the defense bar breathed a 
collective sigh of relief.  But, it is not clear that defense attorneys are 
out of prosecutors’ crosshairs simply because of the Stevens acquittal.  
Indeed, the prosecution of Stevens reflects and expands on several 
recent trends in prosecution that will probably not change as a result 
of the acquittal.  First, the government, particularly the FDA, has 
shifted its focus from prosecuting corporations to prosecuting indi-
viduals for misconduct in corporations.7  The FDA has made recent 
 
 1. Transcript of Trial at 9–10, United States v. Stevens, No. RWT-10-694 (D. 
Md. May 10, 2011) [hereinafter Stevens Transcript]. 
 2. Id. at 10.   
 3. Indictment, United States v. Stevens, No. RWT-10-694 (D. Md. April 13, 
2011) [hereinafter Stevens Indictment]. 
 4. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2010).  
 5. Stevens Transcript, supra note 1, at 5. 
 6. Id. at 9–10. 
 7. See, e.g., Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Prepared 
Address to the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 
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pronouncements about its desire to hold responsible corporate offic-
ers accountable for misconduct at pharmaceutical companies.8  The 
FDA has also charged executives with misdemeanors in high-profile 
health care fraud cases in an effort to deter improper marketing prac-
tices within health care companies.9  It is possible that the govern-
ment’s prosecution of Stevens was an attempt to hold someone in the 
corporation responsible for the alleged illegal promotional activities 
of GSK.  If the Stevens prosecution is a natural outgrowth of the gov-
ernment’s effort to prosecute individuals, then Stevens’ acquittal may 
not deter the government from indicting in-house counsel in the fu-
ture. 
Second, in addition to holding corporate officers responsible for 
conduct within the firm, the government has stepped up its effort to 
hold lawyers accountable as gatekeepers at their respective organiza-
tions.  The government has not been shy about prosecuting in-house 
counsel at securities firms for facilitating or actively engaging in secu-
rities violations with their clients.10  Prior to the Stevens prosecution, 
however, the government’s focus on in-house attorneys appeared to 
be based on their involvement in the misconduct.11  Thus, the Stevens 
prosecution expands the scope of gatekeeper prosecutions because 
there is no allegation that Stevens was involved in the actual wrong-
doing.  As the government has ramped up its efforts to hold in-house 
 
2009) [hereinafter Breuer Prepared Address], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf 
(“[P]rosecution of individuals is a cornerstone of our enforcement strategy.”); Lanny 
A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Prepared Keynote Address to the 
Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Prac-
tices Forum (Nov. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Breuer Keynote], available at 
http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongress10/breuer_2.pdf (“Pharmaceuti-
cal companies must ensure that they are dealing honestly and fairly with . . . govern-
ment programs. And if they don’t, the Department of Justice will be vigilant in hold-
ing companies and individuals who break the law accountable . . . by bringing 
criminal indictments if the facts and the law warrant.”); Letter from Margaret Ham-
burg, Comm’r of Food and Drugs, Food and Drug Admin., to the Hon. Charles E. 
Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ham-
burg Letter], available at http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Ham 
burg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAO-report-on-OCI.pdf (explaining the FDA’s intention 
to “to increase the appropriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions . . . to hold respon-
sible corporate officials accountable”). 
 8. See Hamburg Letter, supra note 7. 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. 
Va. 2007). 
 10. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining the government’s prose-
cution of attorneys involved in option backdating with their clients).   
 11. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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attorneys accountable for the actions of their client corporations, it is 
unlikely that the outcome in the Stevens case will deter the govern-
ment from continuing to expand its prosecutions of lawyers as gate-
keepers. 
Third, in recent years, the government has used pretextual prosecu-
tions based on cover-up crimes, such as obstruction of justice, as a 
quick and effective means of obtaining a conviction in a complicated 
case.12  Thus, instead of charging the target of the investigation with 
the conduct that prompted the investigation, the government has cho-
sen to charge the target for actions taken during the course of the in-
vestigation.  The Stevens prosecution may reflect the government’s 
attempt to broaden the reach of pretextual prosecutions because the 
initial target of the FDA’s investigation was GSK, not Stevens.  There 
is no reason to believe that the government will stop looking for ways 
to push the envelope through pretextual prosecutions. 
Fourth, the government has a long history of attacking the corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege through its charging policies.13  The gov-
ernment posits that corporations use the corporate attorney-client 
privilege as a shield to thwart government inquiry into corporate 
practices.  By targeting in-house counsel, the government can gain ac-
cess to privileged documents that may reveal the misconduct of the 
corporation.14  Because the government has a long-standing distrust 
of the corporate attorney-client privilege, it is unlikely that the gov-
ernment will stop trying to find ways to pierce the privilege. 
In short, it is possible that these or other trends will converge again 
and lead to the prosecution of in-house or outside counsel for actions 
in connection with the representation of a client during a government 
investigation.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine not only these 
trends but also the ultimate question of whether Judge Titus is cor-
rect.  Should attorneys fear being prosecuted for decisions they make 
during a document production because the government may not 
agree with their choices?  Should the corporate attorney-client privi-
 
 12. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 9 (2005) (detailing prosecutions of individuals for cover-up crimes rather than 
the substantive crime that initiated the investigation). 
 13. See generally Katrice Bridges Copeland, Preserving the Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199 (2010) [hereinafter Copeland, Preserving] 
(explaining the history of the U.S. Department of Justice charging policies and their 
negative impact on the corporate attorney-client privilege).   
 14. If an attorney is involved in a client’s criminal conduct, the attorney-client 
privilege will not protect communications between the attorney and the client. EDNA 
SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOC-
TRINE 416 (4th ed. 2001). 
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lege be pierced because the government believes that an attorney’s 
actions in responding to its request for information amount to a cov-
er-up of a client’s alleged crimes?  The government already has a sub-
stantial amount of leverage over defense attorneys and their corpo-
rate clients.  But that leverage would be greater still if the government 
could threaten to prosecute the corporation’s attorney and invoke the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege any time the 
government and the defense attorney disagree on the documents that 
a defense attorney must produce in response to a government inquiry.  
In the Stevens case, the government viewed the attorney-client privi-
leged documents, but has still not charged the corporation or any of 
its employees for the alleged illegal promotion that was the original 
subject of investigation.15  As a matter of equity, it is difficult to un-
derstand how the government can charge an attorney for covering up 
a client’s crime when the government has not even charged the client 
with a crime. 
 
 15. On November 3, 2011, GSK announced that it had agreed in principle to a 
three billion dollar settlement with the government to resolve civil and criminal 
claims regarding (1) the development and marketing of its drug Avandia, (2) the 
DOJ’s investigation regarding GSK’s fraud in the Medicare Rebate Program, and (3) 
the eight-year investigation into GSK’s sales and marketing programs for several 
popular GSK drugs. Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline, GlaxoSmithKline Reaches 
Agreement in Principle to Resolve Multiple Investigations with U.S. Government 
(Nov. 3, 2011) [hereinafter GSK Press Release], available at http://www.gsk.com/ 
media/pressreleases/2011/2011-pressrelease-710182.htm; see also Dominic Rushe, 
GlaxoSmithKline Pays £1.9bn to Settle U.S. Legal Inquiries, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/03/glaxosmithkline-pays-three-
billion-dollars-to-settle-us-probe.  The terms and payment of the settlement are to be 
worked out in 2012.  Presumably, some portion of this settlement relates to the off-
label promotion of Wellbutrin, but at the time of publication, the details are still un-
clear.  Most likely, GSK will enter into a Corporate Integrity Agreement with the 
government in which GSK will agree to compliance measures to ensure that these 
problems do not recur.  If there are criminal charges against GSK, two possible sce-
narios based on the government’s history with these types of prosecutions emerge.  
First, the government might charge GSK with a misdemeanor, which would prevent 
GSK from facing collateral consequences of conviction, such as exclusion from par-
ticipation in Medicare and Medicaid. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.  Pros-
ecutors often pursue this course of conduct because patients would be harmed by 
their inability to obtain Medicare or Medicaid reimbursements for GSK drugs. See 
Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) [here-
inafter Copeland, Enforcing Integrity].  Alternatively, the government might charge a 
subsidiary of GSK with a felony and allow that subsidiary to be excluded from Medi-
care and Medicaid without having a negative impact on GSK’s ability to participate 
in Medicare and Medicaid. Id.  When the government pursued Pfizer for off-label 
promotion of its drug Bextra, it allowed Pfizer to create a shell subsidiary to plead 
guilty and be excluded from Medicare and Medicaid. Id.  No matter which of these 
options the government pursues, the felony charges against Stevens were more seri-
ous than any potential criminal charges that GSK might face.   
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This Article argues that the prosecution of Lauren Stevens for cov-
ering up the alleged crimes of GSK was misguided both as a matter of 
law and a matter of policy.  In particular, this Article contends that 
the government should not prosecute attorneys for obstruction of jus-
tice or other cover-up crimes for actions taken in good faith during a 
government investigation into a client’s conduct.16  Part I provides 
background on the Lauren Stevens case and the convergence of the 
four prosecution trends that led the government to indict her.17  Part 
II argues that Lauren Stevens did not obstruct the government’s in-
vestigation of GSK. 18 Accordingly, the government should not have 
sought attorney-client privileged documents by invoking the crime-
fraud exception or charged Stevens because the evidence did not sup-
port the charges.  Part III argues that the government should not 
charge in-house or outside counsel for obstruction of justice when the 
attorney’s actions were taken in good faith during the representation 
of the client.  It proposes that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
provide guidance to U.S. Attorneys on bringing charges against de-
fense counsel.  In addition, it recommends that the DOJ institute a 
rule requiring approval before instituting charges against defense 
counsel for actions taken during the course of the investigation.19  
This Article concludes that the good faith standard, guidance to pros-
ecutors, and an approval mechanism are necessary actions to rein in 
overzealous prosecutors who may seek to target their adversaries in 
government investigations.20 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The FDA’s Investigation of GlaxoSmithKline 
In 2002, the FDA investigated GSK for promoting Wellbutrin, an 
antidepressant drug, for weight loss.  Under the law, a prescription 
drug that has been approved by the FDA for one use (depression) 
may not be promoted as safe and effective for an unapproved use 
(weight loss).21  The practice of promoting an approved drug for an 
unapproved use is referred to as off-label marketing.  The FDA sent 
GSK a letter to inform them that the FDA had reason to believe that 
 
 16. See discussion infra Part III.  
 17. See discussion infra Part I. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II. 
 19. See discussion infra Part III. 
 20. See discussion infra Conclusion. 
 21. See Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, supra note 15. 
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GSK had promoted the use of Wellbutrin for weight loss, an unap-
proved use.22  In the letter, the FDA requested copies of materials re-
garding GSK’s marketing programs, “including copies of all slides, 
videos, handouts and other materials presented or distributed at any 
GSK program or activity related to Wellbutrin.”23  Further, the FDA 
asked GSK to “identify any compensation provided to individuals in-
volved in programs or activities related to Wellbutrin.”24 
Lauren Stevens was in charge of GSK’s response to the FDA’s in-
quiry and investigation.25  She led a group of lawyers who collected 
documents and information to provide to the FDA. In a telephone 
conference on October 25, 2002, Stevens pledged to make an effort to 
acquire materials from health-care professionals who made presenta-
tions at GSK-sponsored promotional programs.26  She agreed to 
make a “good-faith effort” to attempt to collect these documents even 
if they were not “created by or under the custody or control of 
GSK.”27  There were more than 2000 speakers who had made presen-
tations on Wellbutrin at GSK-sponsored events.28  In December 2002, 
Stevens sent letters to 550 of the speakers requesting slides and mate-
rials that were used while promoting Wellbutrin.29  Only forty of the 
speakers sent materials to Stevens in response to her letter.30  Stevens 
did not, however, end up turning over all of the materials that she re-
ceived from the speakers.  Stevens withheld some slides from doctors 
that demonstrated that those doctors were promoting Wellbutrin for 
weight loss.  She sent each of the offending doctors a letter admonish-
ing them for their off-label promotion and informing them that their 
actions were inconsistent with the “FDA’s requirements, GSK policy, 
and [their] contract[s] with GSK.”31  After consulting with outside 
counsel, Stevens did not produce the allegedly incriminating presen-
tation materials.32 
At the FDA’s request, Stevens prepared a document that summa-
rized the payments to doctors who were involved in programs related 
 
 22. Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 4. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 5. 
 32. Id. at 9–10. 
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to Wellbutrin. Initially, when the document was created, Stevens had 
included a column entitled “Entertainment” that specified any enter-
tainment costs incurred on behalf of the doctors such as spa treat-
ments, ski trips, and sporting events.  GSK’s outside counsel, a former 
FDA attorney, told Stevens not to include the entertainment col-
umn.33  Thus, she deleted that column before turning the document 
over to the FDA.34  In her final response letter to the FDA, Stevens 
indicated that the production of documents was complete.35  She also 
stated, “[a]lthough there were isolated deficiencies, the objective evi-
dence clearly demonstrates that GlaxoSmithKline has not developed, 
maintained, or encouraged promotional plans or activities to pro-
mote, directly or indirectly, Wellbutrin for weight loss, the treatment 
of obesity, or any other unapproved indication.”36  Approximately 
four months later, a whistleblower provided the government with 
slides from two doctors that showed that they promoted Wellbutrin 
for weight loss.37  All of these facts regarding Stevens’ deliberations 
with outside counsel came to light because a magistrate judge in Mas-
sachusetts granted the prosecutor access to the documents based on 
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.38 
On November 18, 2010, Stevens was indicted for obstruction of jus-
tice, false statements, and aiding and abetting for her conduct during 
the 2002 investigation.39  In March 2011, Judge Titus dismissed Ste-
vens’ indictment without prejudice because the prosecutor misin-
formed the grand jury regarding the impact of the “advice of counsel” 
defense.40  On April 13, 2011, Stevens was re-indicted for obstruction 
of justice and false statements.  The case went to trial on April 27, 
 
 33. Id. at 9. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 10. 
 36. Id. at 12. 
 37. Id. at 11. 
 38. Judge Titus references the magistrate judge’s decision in the trial transcript, 
but not in a written order.   
 39. See Stevens Indictment, supra note 3. 
 40. United States v. Stevens, 711 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (D. Md. 2011).  In response 
to a juror question about whether it mattered if Stevens “was getting direction from 
somebody else about how to handle this,” the prosecutor stated that the advice of 
counsel defense was only relevant at trial and that if the grand jurors found probable 
cause on the elements, that is sufficient to return an indictment. Id. at 564–65.  The 
court found that this was an inappropriate response because the advice of counsel is 
not an affirmative defense.  It negates the mens rea required for the obstruction of 
justice charges. Id. 
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2011.41  At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, the defendant 
made a motion for judgment of acquittal.42  The motion pointed out 
several deficiencies in the prosecution’s case, argued that the obstruc-
tion of justice counts should be dismissed because of the safe harbor 
provision and maintained that Stevens’ actions were based on the ad-
vice of counsel.43  On May 10, 2011, Judge Titus granted the defense’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal.44  The judge found that Stevens’ an-
swers to the FDA requests were not perfect, but were made in good 
faith reliance on outside counsel’s advice.  The judge said, “I conclude 
on the basis of the record before me that only with a jaundiced eye 
and with an inference of guilt that’s inconsistent with the presumption 
of innocence could a reasonable jury ever convict this defendant.”45  
Reportedly, the jury applauded when the judge informed them that 
he was granting the judgment of acquittal and that their service was 
complete.46 
B. Prosecution Trends and the Lauren Stevens Case 
The government’s prosecution of Lauren Stevens for obstruction of 
justice and false statements can be explained, at least in part, by pros-
ecution trends in the last several years.  The government has in-
creased its efforts to hold individuals responsible for conduct at cor-
porations through the use of the “responsible corporate officer” doc-
doctrine and the prosecution of attorneys as gatekeepers.47  Further, 
the government continues to demonstrate a preference for prosecut-
ing individuals for cover-up crimes rather than the crime that initiated 
the investigation.48  Finally, the government’s prosecution strategy 
has also shown its hostility to corporate attorney-client privilege.49  
 
 41. Tom Schoenberg, Ex-Glaxo Lawyer ‘Went Too Far,’ U.S. Says at Opening of 
Obstruction Case, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-04-27/ex-glaxo-lawyer-went-too-far-u-s-says-at-opening-of-obstruction-
trial.html. 
 42. Lauren Stevens’ Motion Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 for Judgment of Acquittal, 
United States v. Stevens, No. 10-CR-694-RWT (D. Md. May 8, 2011) [hereinafter 
Stevens’ Motion for Acquittal]. 
 43. Id. at 2–3. 
 44. Stevens Transcript, supra note 1, at 10.   
 45. Id. at 8. 
 46. Sue Reisinger, Crossing the Line: The Trial of GlaxoSmithKline Lawyer Lau-
ren Stevens, CORPORATE COUNSEL (June 23, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/Pub 
ArticleCC.jsp?id=1202497750428. 
 47. See Hamburg Letter, supra note 7. 
 48. See, e.g., Green, supra note 12.  
 49. See, e.g., Copeland, Preserving, supra note 13.  
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These trends were fused together in the prosecution of Lauren Ste-
vens. 
1. Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine 
Prosecutors have been under considerable pressure to combat 
health care fraud and abuse.  The government has dedicated substan-
tial resources to detecting and deterring fraud in our Medicare and 
Medicaid systems.50  One of the most important targets for the gov-
ernment’s enforcement efforts has been large pharmaceutical compa-
nies like GSK.  Over the last ten years, the government has cracked 
down on pharmaceutical companies that engaged in off-label promo-
tion.51  Many drug companies engaged in off-label promotion without 
regard to the truth of their claims or the safety of consumers.52  In-
deed, some manufacturers promoted FDA-approved drugs for uses 
that the FDA had explicitly found to be unsafe.53  Other manufactur-
ers were so defiant of the FDA rules that they had entire departments 
dedicated to off-label promotion.54  Although the government spent 
years investigating pharmaceutical manufacturers for their improper 
 
 50. Tracy Russo, HEAT: A Year of Tackling Health Care Fraud, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST.: JUST. BLOG (Aug. 27, 2010), http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/934 (detailing 
the administration’s efforts and successes in combating health care fraud through in-
creased budgets and collaborations between the U.S. Department of Justice and the 
Department of Health and Human Services).  
 51. SAMMY ALMASHAT ET AL., PUB. CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GRP., RAPID-
LY INCREASING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AGAINST THE PHAR-
MACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 1991 TO 2010 18 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www. 
citizen.org/documents/rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenalties.pdf  (“From 1991 
through 2005, unlawful promotion constituted only 16 percent of all [health care 
fraud] violations, comprising only $516 million in financial penalties. Over the past 
five years (2006-2010), unlawful promotion came to comprise over half (53 percent) 
of all violations totaling at least $3.3 billion in financial penalties, a six-fold increase 
in financial penalties for this violation compared with the previous fifteen years. In 
comparison, total financial penalties for all violations increased just three-fold over 
this same time period.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Ryan McCarthy, Eli Lilly’s Marketing Fraud and Ghostwriting 
Scandal, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/ 
12/eli-lillys-zyprexa-fraud_n_214907.html (explaining that Eli Lilly marketed its anti-
psychotic drug Zyprexa for use by elderly patients with dementia despite seven stud-
ies that demonstrated that it was unsafe for that use). 
 53. See, e.g., Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, supra note 15 (explaining that Pfizer 
marketed its drug Bextra, a painkiller known as a Cox-2 inhibitor, for post-surgical 
pain even though the FDA explicitly found that Bextra was unsafe for that use). 
 54. See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumption in 
the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 61, 111–12 (2008) (explaining the coordinated effort that Parke-Davis engaged 
in to pursue the off-label promotion of its drug Neurontin). 
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promotional practices, the government’s enforcement efforts mostly 
consisted of entering into civil administrative settlements with phar-
maceutical companies that required manufacturers to pay a fine and 
agree to compliance measures.55  In the event that the government ac-
tually charged the pharmaceutical company with a crime, the charge 
was a misdemeanor so that the pharmaceutical company would not be 
excluded from participation in Medicare and Medicaid.56  Because the 
fines and criminal penalties that prosecutors imposed on pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers were significantly lower than the profits that the 
manufacturers obtained by engaging in off-label promotion, the man-
ufacturers viewed the fines as just a cost of doing business.57  As a re-
sult, the government has gone back to the drawing board, so to speak, 
to find more effective ways to enforce the drug marketing rules. 
In an effort to deter this misconduct, the government has begun 
targeting individuals within corporations for criminal charges.  On 
March 4, 2010, the FDA called for more prosecutions of responsible 
corporate officers under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).58  
Under the “responsible corporate officer” (RCO) doctrine, “‘[o]ne 
who has control over activities that lead to a subordinate’s violation 
of a statute may incur liability for failure to fulfill the duty, commen-
surate with his position of authority in the corporate hierarchy, to 
 
 55. See, e.g., Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, supra note 15, at 2 (detailing numer-
ous instances of the government concluding their investigations with Corporate In-
tegrity Agreements). 
 56. The effect of an exclusion from Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health 
care programs is that “no Federal health care program payment may be made for any 
items or services (1) furnished by an excluded individual or entity, or (2) directed or 
prescribed by an excluded physician.” Office of Inspector General, Publication of the 
OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on the Effect of Exclusion From Participation in Fed-
eral Health Care Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 52, 791-02 (Sept. 30, 1999). 
 57. See, e.g., Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, supra note 15, at 3 (explaining that 
the repeated use of Corporate Integrity Agreements to resolve off-label promotion 
cases has been ineffective at deterring manufacturers from repeatedly engaging in 
off-label promotion because the fines imposed in the agreements are nothing more 
than the cost of doing business and are substantially outweighed by the potential 
profits from off-label promotion).  
 58. Hamburg Letter, supra note 7.  The FDA commissioner explained: 
A third recommendation from the committee was to increase the appropri-
ate use of misdemeanor prosecutions, a valuable enforcement tool, to hold 
responsible corporate officials accountable. Criteria now have been devel-
oped for consideration in selection of misdemeanor prosecution cases and 
will be incorporated into the revised policies and procedures that cover ap-
propriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions.   
Id.  
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prevent or correct such violations.’”59  Importantly, a responsible cor-
porate officer can be held liable even though he did not have personal 
knowledge of or participate in the wrongdoing.60  The only defense 
that is available is that the “defendant was ‘powerless’ to prevent or 
correct the violation.”61  But the courts have not specified the stand-
ard necessary to satisfy that burden.  By using the RCO doctrine, the 
government is able to send a message to corporate executives that 
they must monitor their employees or face personal criminal liability.  
Thus, after years of treating the pharmaceutical industry with kid 
gloves, the FDA is flexing its muscles. 
In February 2011, the FDA updated its Regulatory Procedures 
Manual (RPM) to provide non-binding guidance to FDA personnel 
on whether to recommend a misdemeanor prosecution against an ex-
ecutive under the RCO doctrine.62  The RPM instructs FDA person-
nel to consider “the individual’s position in the company and relation-
ship to the violation, and whether the official had the authority to 
correct or prevent the violation.”63  The RPM also notes that 
“[k]nowledge of and actual participation in the violation are not a 
prerequisite to a misdemeanor prosecution but are factors that may 
be relevant.”64  The RPM lists seven other factors for FDA personnel 
to consider: 
1. Whether the violation involves actual or potential harm to the 
public; 
2. Whether the violation is obvious; 
3. Whether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal behavior 
and/or failure to heed prior warnings; 
4. Whether the violation is widespread; 
5. Whether the violation is serious; 
6. The quality of the legal and factual support for the proposed 
prosecution; and 
 
 59. See JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 248 (4th ed. 2009) (quoting Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Cor-
porate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses—Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 
1338–40 (1982)). 
 60. Id. at 231.  
 61. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975). 
 62. FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 6-5-3 (2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/ucm1
76738.htm#SUB6-5-3 (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).   
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
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7. Whether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of agency re-
sources.65 
The FDA has successfully used the RCO doctrine to hold execu-
tives, including in-house counsel, criminally liable for misdemeanor 
offenses under the FDCA.  One prominent example is the guilty plea 
and subsequent exclusion of Purdue Pharma executives as responsible 
corporate officers for the improper marketing of OxyContin.66  The 
government alleged that Purdue Pharma marketed OxyContin, a 
time-released painkiller, as “being ‘less addictive and less subject to 
abuse’ than existing painkillers.”67  In fact, OxyContin instead was a 
highly addictive painkiller that reportedly led to many deaths and 
criminal activity by its users.68  The government charged the general 
counsel, Howard Udell, and two other executives with misdemeanor 
misbranding as responsible corporate officers for Purdue Pharma’s 
false marketing.  The FDCA’s misbranding prohibition is incredibly 
broad and, among other things, has been interpreted to mean that it is 
a crime to include false or misleading information about a drug on its 
label or in advertisements.69  Although the government never speci-
fied the theory of liability for Udell under the RCO doctrine, it is pos-
sible that Udell signed off on promotional materials for OxyContin as 
part of his responsibilities as general counsel.70  As such, he was likely 
considered to be responsible for ensuring that the marketing materi-
als complied with the law.  As part of Udell’s guilty plea, he paid a fi-
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 
2007). 
 67. Jill Nawrocki, OxyContin Flap to Cost Purdue Pharma GC $8M, CORP. 
COUNS. (June 25, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1182503148 
067.  When the FDA first approved OxyContin, the FDA permitted “Purdue Pharma 
to state the time-released nature of a narcotic like OxyContin ‘is believed to reduce’ 
its potential to be abused.” Barry Meier, Narcotic Maker Guilty of Deceit Over Mar-
keting, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/business/11 
drug.html.  But the sales representatives wrongly informed doctors that “the state-
ment meant that OxyContin was less likely to lead to addiction or abuse than tradi-
tional, fast-acting painkillers like Percocet.” Id. 
 68. Nawrocki, supra note 67 (explaining that there were 228 OxyContin-related 
deaths in the Western District of Virginia from 1996 to 2005). 
 69. The FDCA prohibits “[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into in-
terstate commerce of any food, drug, device, tobacco product, or cosmetic that is 
adulterated or misbranded.” 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).  A drug or device is consid-
ered to be misbranded if it has a “false or misleading label” or does not bear “ade-
quate directions for use.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(a), 352(f) (2006). 
 70. Nawrocki, supra note 67. 
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ne of eight million dollars to the Virginia Medicaid Control Unit’s 
Program Income Fund.71 
The large fine, however, was only a part of Udell’s sanction.  On 
March 31, 2008, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) sent a letter to Udell 
informing him that he would be excluded from participation in Medi-
care, Medicaid, and all other federal health care programs for twenty 
years.72  The letter explained that the exclusion was a result of his 
conviction of a misdemeanor offense relating to fraud, theft, embez-
zlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial miscon-
duct in the delivery of a health care item or service.73  The result of 
exclusion of a health care executive is that the executive is virtually 
unemployable in the health care industry.74  Exclusion, however, is 
not a criminal penalty.  It is meant to safeguard the Medicare and 
Medicaid systems from untrustworthy health care providers. 
Udell appealed his debarment within HHS.  He argued that be-
cause his conviction was based on his status as a responsible corpo-
rate officer and not his own personal wrongdoing, it was improper to 
exclude him under the statute.  HHS upheld his exclusion at every 
level of review.  On October 28, 2009, Udell filed an action in district 
court against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen 
 
 71. Plea Agreement, United States v. Udell, No. 1:07CR29 (W.D. Va. May 10, 
2007), available at http://www.vawd.uscourts.gov/PurdueFrederickCo/Plea-Agreeme 
nt-Udell.pdf. 
 72. Udell v. Inspector Gen., No. C-08-493, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
Dep’tal Appeals Bd. (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/ 
civildecisions/2009/CR1884.pdf.  An individual who has been convicted of a misde-
meanor relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or 
other financial misconduct may be excluded from participation in all federal health 
care programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1) (2006). 
 73. Udell, No. C-08-493, available at http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/civildeci 
sions/2009/CR1884.pdf. 
 74. Health care companies that employ or enter into contracts with excluded indi-
viduals or entities to provide items or services to Federal program beneficiaries will 
face civil monetary penalties.  Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on 
the Effect of Exclusion from Participation in Federal Health Care Programs, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 52,793 (Sept. 30, 1999).  Thus, the only time that an excluded individual could 
work for a health care company that contracts with the government without the com-
pany being penalized is when the company “is both able to pay the individual exclu-
sively with private funds or from other non-federal funding sources, and where the 
services furnished by the excluded individual relate solely to non-federal program 
patients.” Id.  Therefore, “the practical effect of an OIG exclusion is to preclude em-
ployment of an excluded individual in any capacity by a health care provider that re-
ceives reimbursement, indirectly or directly, from a federal health care program.” Id. 
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Sebelius, challenging his exclusion.75  The district court upheld the ex-
clusion and flatly rejected Udell’s argument that his exclusion was 
improper because he was convicted based solely on his status and did 
not engage in any wrongdoing.76  Udell’s appeal to the D.C. Circuit is 
currently pending. 
After the success of the Udell case, there can be no doubt that the 
FDA intends to pursue executives, even general counsel, as responsi-
ble corporate officers.  The goal of these prosecutions is to hold 
someone within the corporation accountable for the misconduct.  
Through these prosecutions, the government sends a strong message 
to corporate executives to conform their conduct to the law and to 
vigorously monitor their employees to ensure compliance. 
This development in the enforcement of health care fraud and 
abuse laws may help to explain, at least in part, the prosecution of 
Lauren Stevens.  While the government did not formally invoke the 
RCO doctrine in Stevens’ case, the prosecution is certainly in the spir-
it of the government’s stated objective to hold “responsible corporate 
officers” accountable for wrongdoing within the corporation.  One 
might argue that as general counsel, Stevens was supposed to make 
sure that GSK’s drug marketing practices complied with the law.  
Therefore, by punishing Stevens, the responsible corporate officer, 
someone within GSK is accountable for GSK’s misconduct rather 
than the faceless corporation.  By charging Stevens with felonies that 
carried substantial penalties, however, the government substantially 
raised the stakes of the typical responsible corporate officer prosecu-
tions on misdemeanor charges. 
2. Attorneys as Gatekeepers 
While there has been a push to hold responsible corporate officers 
accountable in general, there has also been a specific threat to general 
counsel as “gatekeepers.”  Gatekeepers are responsible for prevent-
ing misconduct.  Traditionally, however, lawyers have maintained in-
dependence from their clients such that the lawyers were not held re-
sponsible for the transgressions of their clients.77  In some situations, 
that tradition of independence allowed lawyers to turn a blind eye to 
 
 75. Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D. D.C. 2010). 
 76. Id. at 117–18.   
 77. Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who 
Better to Prevent Corporate Crime, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 332 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley]. 
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client wrongdoing.78  The government, convinced that diligent lawyers 
could have thwarted client misconduct in many cases involving finan-
cial fraud,79 has increased the pressure on in-house counsel to be ef-
fective gatekeepers.  In particular, the government has pursued in-
house counsel criminally when frauds that presumably could have 
been avoided occur in the corporation.80  Essentially, the government 
holds attorneys criminally responsible for their own misconduct81 and 
for their failure to nip their clients’ misconduct in the bud.82 
After the financial scandals in 2000 and 2001, Congress singled out 
attorneys as gatekeepers in the securities market through the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act.83  Section 307, which addresses attorneys, “was de-
signed to enlist lawyers in the cause of preventing corporate crime.”84  
Under section 307, Congress gave the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC or the Commission) the authority to establish “mini-
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Su Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gate-
keeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1037 (2005) [hereinafter Kim, Banality] (explain-
ing that in “the SEC’s view, general counsels could play a greater role in their com-
panies if only they would, by an act of conscious will, assert themselves more, claim a 
place ‘at the table,’ and, magically, gain ‘access to the board.’”). 
 80. See generally id. 
 81. See generally Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s 
Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (2003) (explaining the role that law-
yers played in aiding the corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002). 
 82. “A review of the gatekeeping literature suggests that a gatekeeper enforce-
ment regime must have at least three key elements: (1) a gatekeeper—someone ‘who 
can and will prevent misconduct reliably,’ (2) a gate—some service which the wrong-
doer needs to accomplish his goal, and (3) a law enforcement mechanism—an en-
forceable duty—that obligates private parties to take some action aimed at averting 
misconduct when detected.” Su Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 411, 415 (2008) [hereinafter Kim, Gatekeepers] (internal citations omitted). 
 83. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see also Kim, Banality, su-
pra note 79, at 985 (“Recognizing that many of these lawyers facilitated illegal trans-
actions or failed to act to protect the organizational client, Congress passed a statute 
singling out inside counsel, for the first in U.S. history, for special treatment in the 
fight against securities fraud.”). 
 84. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 77, at 324.  Senator Edwards, explaining 
the need for Section 307, said:  
One of the most critical responsibilities that [corporate] lawyers have is, 
when they see something occurring or about to occur that violates the law, 
breaks the law, they must act as an advocate for the shareholders, for the 
company itself, for the investors. They are there and they can see what is 
happening. They know the law and their responsibility is to do something 
about it if they see the law being broken or about to be broken. 
Id. at 337 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551-52 (daily ed. July 10, 
2002)).   
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mum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and 
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of 
issuers.”85  Specifically, section 307 directed the SEC to enact a rule 
“requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of 
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty . . . to the chief legal counsel 
or the chief executive officer of the company.”86  In addition, the SEC 
was to adopt a rule requiring further up the ladder reporting if the 
chief legal counsel or chief executive officer did not respond appro-
priately.87 
Since the enactment of section 307, the government has brought 
criminal charges against several attorneys for failing to meet their ob-
ligations as gatekeepers.  In particular, the government has targeted 
attorneys involved in option backdating.88  The SEC’s first target for 
option backdating was William Sorin, former general counsel of 
Comverse Technology.  Sorin was responsible for drafting Comverse 
Technology’s stock option plans.  He was also responsible for filing 
false reports with the SEC that did not acknowledge the additional 
compensation provided to executives by the option backdating.89  
Sorin made over fourteen million dollars from selling backdated stock 
options.90  The SEC sued Sorin, and the DOJ charged him criminally 
for his actions.91  He ultimately settled with the SEC for millions of 
dollars and pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securi-
ties, mail, and wire fraud.92  Following the Sorin prosecution, the SEC 
and DOJ successfully prosecuted general counsel for option backdat-
ing at many prominent companies including Apple, Inc., United 
 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. The practice of option backdating involves granting stock options to coincide 
with a date in the past when the stock price was at a historic low for the quarter.  For 
example, if the stock price of a company is $50 today, but the stock options are back-
dated two months to when the stock price was at a low of $20, the executive will have 
a profit of $30/share if she exercises her stock options.  By granting backdated op-
tions, companies were able to provide additional off-the-book compensation to exec-
utives. 
 89. Association of Corporate Counsel, From Trusted Counselor to Vigilant Gate-
keeper: The Evolving Liability Environment for Corporate Counsel 23 (Sept. 2007), 
available at http://www.acc.com/vl/public/Article/loader.cfm?csModule=security/get 
file&pageid=1592. 
 90. Id. at 32. 
 91. Id. at 24.  
 92. Id.; see also Chad Bray, Former Comverse Counsel Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/03/business/03comverse.html?page 
wanted=all. 
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Health, CNET, and McAfee, to name a few.93  In general, “the SEC 
has targeted attorneys (and other executives) when there has [sic] 
been written indications of deliberate backdating, falsified docu-
ments, efforts to hide manipulations from auditors or investigators, 
and indications that the attorneys personally benefited.”94  The SEC 
has also pursued in-house counsel for their involvement in other types 
of accounting scandals.95 
In addition to its prosecution of the option backdating and ac-
counting scandals, the government has also ramped up its efforts to 
pursue general counsel for misconduct during internal investigations.  
The most prominent target in this category was Ann Baskins, the 
former general counsel for Hewlett Packard (HP).  The investigation 
at HP was initiated to look into leaks of confidential business infor-
mation from HP board meetings.96  As part of the investigation, how-
ever, HP’s outside investigators engaged in the practice of “pre-
texting,” meaning “using false pretenses to obtain certain board 
members’ personal information from telephone companies.”97  At the 
Congressional hearings on the scandal at HP, Baskins exercised her 
Fifth Amendment privilege, and her colleagues laid the blame for the 
pretexting squarely on Baskins and her poor legal advice.98  Ultimate-
ly, the government indicted Baskins’ colleague Kevin T. Hunsaker, 
another in-house counsel, for the pretexting scandal.99 
The government has not been shy about using its newly found 
power to charge in-house counsel criminally.  Throughout all of the 
prosecutions of in-house counsel, however, the trend has been “that 
the in-house counsel being prosecuted are those against whom the 
government can level allegations that the lawyer was both an essential 
participant in fraudulent conduct and knew and understood at the 
time that the conduct was fraudulent.”100  Thus, the Lauren Stevens 
case is somewhat of a departure from the typical gatekeeper prosecu-
tions because there was no allegation that Stevens was involved in the 
off-label promotional activities or their approval.  Therefore, the gov-
ernment’s prosecution of Stevens could be seen as an expansion of 
gatekeeper liability. 
 
 93. Association of Corporate Counsel, supra note 89, at 25, 27–29. 
 94. Id. at 30. 
 95. Id. at 57–63. 
 96. See Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 82, at 412.  
 97. Id.  
 98. See id.   
 99. Association of Corporate Counsel, supra note 89, at 34.   
 100. Id. at 80.   
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3. Pretextual Prosecutions and the Expansion of the Cover-Up 
Crimes 
The prosecution of corporations and individuals for accounting 
scandals and complex fraud schemes is time consuming, fact inten-
sive, and difficult to explain to juries.  Not surprisingly, the govern-
ment has searched for more economical and efficient means of prose-
cuting individuals and corporations for misconduct.  One method that 
the government has employed is to target the cover-up of the wrong-
doing during the investigation through the obstruction of justice stat-
utes.  Congress enacted the federal obstruction of justice statutes to 
protect the honor and integrity of proceedings before the federal ju-
diciary, federal agencies, and the United States Congress.101  Thus, 
obstruction of justice is a “process crime,” which is concerned with 
punishing those who harm the justice system rather than an individual 
victim.102 
Over the past several years, prosecutors have charged defendants 
with process crimes instead of or in addition to the substantive of-
fense.103  Thus, if the government was investigating an individual for 
money laundering, but the individual engaged in obstructive conduct 
during the investigation, the prosecutor would charge the individual 
with obstruction of justice instead of or in addition to money launder-
ing.  The practice of charging defendants with process crimes rather 
than the substantive offense that initiated the investigation has been 
termed “pretextual prosecution.”104  This prosecution strategy has 
taken off in recent years due to the complexity of trials involving ac-
counting scandals and other complicated business transactions.105  
 
 101. Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Poli-
cies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721 
(2003); Justin Alexander Kasprisin, Obstruction of Justice, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847 
(2010).  
 102. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 
GEO. L.J. 1435, 1439–41 (2009) (explaining that the phrase process crime refers to  
“criminal offenses with content addressing acts that interfere with the procedures and 
administration of justice.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135 (2004). 
 104. See Green, supra note 12, at 37 n.142; Litman, supra note 103, at 1137; Mur-
phy, supra note 102, at 1442–45; Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prose-
cutions of the Business Scandals of 2002–03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s 
Clash With Donaldson Over Turf, The Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the 
Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 449 (2004); Daniel 
C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political 
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 584 (2005).   
 105. Oesterle, supra note 104, at 446–49 (explaining the consequences of complex 
cases, such as (1) long and expensive trials with costly experts; (2) defendants with 
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Prosecutors have made the judgment that obstruction of justice and 
other process crimes are easier for a jury to understand.  So long as 
the process crime charge is meritorious, the issue is whether the pros-
ecutor’s decision to charge the process crime, rather than the underly-
ing offense that initiated the investigation, is justified.106 
In addition to the prosecutors who resort to pretextual prosecu-
tions based on process crimes, there is also some scholarly support for 
pretextual prosecutions of this type.  Professor Harry Litman argues 
that pretextual prosecutions are justified because they reflect the 
prosecutor’s broad choice among potential defendants.107  Because 
the cases against the potential defendants will vary in terms of the se-
riousness of the crime, strength of evidence, and the collateral benefit 
to the community, it is understandable that the prosecutor would 
choose to charge the defendant who is “plainly guilty” and whose 
prosecution would be of greatest benefit to the community.108  Thus, 
so long as the charge is meritorious, Professor Litman argues that the 
use of pretextual prosecutions is beneficial.109 
Professors Daniel C. Richman and William J. Stuntz acknowledge 
that charging white collar criminals with pretextual crimes “conserves 
investigative resources and reduces the risk of serious injustice.”110  
Thus, criminals cannot escape punishment for committing offenses 
that inflict harm on many people due to the complexity of the case.  
And, the government can maximize its resources by pursuing less se-
rious charges that require little expertise. 
One prominent example is Martha Stewart, whom the government 
charged with obstruction of justice and perjury for lying to investiga-
tors about her sale of ImClone stock rather than insider trading (the 
 
deeper pockets that can hire excellent attorneys and experts and outspend the prose-
cution; (3) juries that are overwhelmed by complex facts; and (4) in cases where sev-
eral people are involved in the wrongdoing, difficulty assigning individual guilt).   
 106. See Murphy, supra note 102, at 1442–43 (explaining the difference between a 
pretextual prosecution and a baseless prosecution).  Professor Murphy explains that 
process crimes make the perfect pretextual crimes because: (1) they “penalize a core 
of harmful activity that most agree ought to be outlawed;” (2) process crimes have 
long sentences for their violation; (3) the government is able to “create environments 
(such as grand jury hearings or discovery requests)” where process crimes are likely 
to occur; and (4) process crimes “derive from some primary transgression—however 
unprovable it may be.” Id. at 1444–45. 
 107. Litman, supra note 103, at 1159–60. 
 108. Id. at 1161. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 595.  
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underlying offense).111  But, until recently, this strategy was largely 
reserved for corporate executives who were accused of wrongdoing or 
individuals accused of wrongdoing.  The charges were essentially a 
pretext because the principal reason for the obstruction charge is not 
the obstructive activity; it is to ensure that the individual is punished 
for the underlying criminality which may be too difficult to prove at 
trial.112 
The important difference between the Stevens prosecution and 
other cases where obstruction is charged instead of the underlying of-
fense is that Stevens had no involvement in the alleged underlying 
criminal conduct.  Presumably, the fault for the alleged off-label pro-
motion could not be assigned to Stevens.  The individuals involved in 
the promotional activities, their supervisors, and/or the executives of 
the company would be to blame for the promotional practices.  There 
is no allegation that Stevens advised the executives on their 
Wellbutrin promotional activities.  Therefore, Stevens was charged 
solely for actions that she took in connection with representing the 
company after the alleged criminal conduct occurred.  Her alleged 
wrongdoing arose during the course of her investigation of GSK’s al-
leged criminal conduct. 
Thus, the prosecution cannot be justified based on the belief that 
charging her will produce an “important collateral benefit to the pub-
lic welfare” such as preventing her from taking similar actions in in-
vestigations in the future.113  There was no evidence that Stevens had 
counseled GSK to engage in off-label promotion.  Accordingly, Ste-
vens could not be considered a facilitator of the fraud.114  As Stevens 
was neither suspected of other crimes nor a facilitator of GSK’s al-
leged crimes, her prosecution cannot be justified by the need to con-
serve judicial resources or risk a major injustice.115 
 
 111. Dan Ackman, Martha Stewart Found Guilty, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2004), available 
at http://www.forbes.com/2004/03/05/cx_da_0305marthafinal.html. 
 112. Litman, supra note 103, at 1135, 1147 (calling these types of prosecutions the 
Al Capone approach because Al Capone was a Chicago mobster who was charged 
with federal tax evasion instead of his many alleged crimes). 
 113. Litman, supra note 103, at 1161. 
 114. Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 688 (2005) 
[Henning, Targeting].  In United States v. Anderson, the government indicted two 
attorneys for assisting their client, a hospital, in creating a legal way to compensate 
two doctors for patient referrals. 85 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (1999), rev’d 217 F.3d 823 (10th 
Cir. 2000).  The attorneys did this to circumvent the Stark law, which prevents pay-
ments for physician referrals.  In that case, the court found that the lawyers facilitated 
the fraud. Id. 
 115. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 104, at 595.  
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One lingering question is whether the government prosecuted Ste-
vens as a proxy for GSK.  In other words, was the prosecution of Ste-
vens the government’s strategy for punishing GSK?  Or, did the gov-
ernment prosecute Stevens because it wanted to punish her for her 
obstructive conduct?  It is important to note that just because Stevens 
was charged with  process crimes does not necessarily mean that the 
prosecution was pretextual.  But, like many pretextual prosecutions 
based on process crimes, Stevens’ alleged wrongdoing occurred dur-
ing the course of the government’s investigation of entirely different 
conduct, and there were no criminal charges for the underlying mis-
conduct.  To date, neither GSK nor any of its employees have been 
criminally charged with any wrongdoing associated with the alleged 
off-label promotion.  Thus, one could certainly infer that after eight 
years of investigating GSK for off-label promotion, the government 
saw an easy way out—the prosecution of Lauren Stevens for covering 
up GSK’s alleged off-label promotion.  In that sense, Stevens’ case 
could be considered a pretextual prosecution where what the gov-
ernment really wants to punish is the off-label promotion, not the 
supposed cover up. 
4. The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege 
For many years, the government has viewed the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege as an impediment to efficient investigation into 
corporate wrongdoing.  In the government’s view, corporations hire 
attorneys to conduct internal investigations to cloak those interac-
tions with the privilege and protect ordinary business documents from 
government discovery.116  In addition, corporations are perceived as 
protecting their employees by entering into joint defense agreements 
and paying employees’ legal fees.117  Because internal investigations 
 
 116. See The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corpo-
rate Investigations: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 117–18 
(2007) (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen.) [hereinafter The Thomp-
son Memorandum’s Effect] (“Prosecutors complain to me that in some instances, 
corporate counsel run virtually every document through the corporation’s legal de-
partment just so that they can assert attorney-client privilege or work product protec-
tion.  Some attorneys assert privilege like that famous scene of Lucille Ball gobbling 
chocolates off of a conveyor belt.  Everything is swallowed up by the in-house legal 
department . . . if the privilege is used in this fashion, it is not only meaningless; it ob-
structs the government’s efforts to discover the truth.  And many U.S. Attorneys’ Of-
fices have spent tens of thousands of dollars in taxpayer money in years of senseless 
litigation over pretrial privilege matters, delaying justice and accountability.”). 
 117. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of 
Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys at VI (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson 
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conducted by corporate counsel are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege, the government is forced to expend more resources to con-
duct the investigation.  If the government is unable to rely on corpo-
rate counsel’s interviews and investigation, the government must 
conduct its own interviews and offer immunity to some witnesses to 
secure their testimony.118  Thus, the government set out to change the 
incentive structure so that corporations would find it in their best in-
terest to turn over documents that would normally be shielded by the 
corporate attorney-client privilege. 
In 2003, following several business scandals, Deputy-Attorney 
General Larry Thompson issued a memorandum entitled “Principles 
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” which became 
known as the Thompson Memorandum.119  Although the Thompson 
 
Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm 
(“Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation appears 
to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.  Thus, while cases will differ de-
pending on the circumstances, a corporation’s promise of support to culpable em-
ployees and agents, either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining 
the employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing infor-
mation to the employees about the government’s investigation pursuant to a joint de-
fense agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and 
value of a corporation’s cooperation.”); The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect, supra 
note 116, at 120 (“[A] corporation’s advancement of legal fees can concern prosecu-
tors where that fact, taken with other facts, gives rise to a real concern that the corpo-
ration is ‘circling the wagons,’ or, in other words, is using or conditioning the payment 
of attorneys’ fees as a tool to limit or prevent the communication of truthful infor-
mation from current and former employees to the government, in order to protect 
either the employees or the corporation itself.”). 
 118. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 117, at VI (“One factor the prosecutor 
may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation’s cooperation is the complete-
ness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work 
product protections, both with respect to its internal investigation and with respect to 
communications between specific officers, directors and employees and counsel.  
Such waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, sub-
jects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity 
agreements.”); Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of 
Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys at 8 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty 
Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo 
.pdf (“[A] company’s disclosure of privileged information may permit the govern-
ment to expedite its investigation.”); The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect, supra 
note 116, at 116 (“If the company decides to cooperate, it can face additional delay 
while the government duplicates the company’s efforts in collecting documents and 
interviewing witnesses, or it may choose to waive privilege and offer the results of its 
internal investigation so that the government moves faster.  The choice to waive of-
ten allows the government to make a charging decision within months rather than 
years, and saves the company money and employee time and protects the value of its 
stock.”). 
 119. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 117. 
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Memorandum was not the DOJ’s first pronouncement on the factors 
to consider in deciding whether to indict a corporation, it was the first 
time that the guidance was considered mandatory.120  The Thompson 
Memorandum focused on cooperation as a critical factor in deciding 
whether to indict a corporation.  It explained that waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege was a factor to consider as well as whether the 
corporation was protecting its culpable employees.121  It also said that 
in “appropriate circumstances” prosecutors could request that corpo-
rations waive the attorney-client privilege.122  The Thompson Memo-
randum was a game-changer in that defense counsel began to report 
that prosecutors would ask for waiver of the privilege in the very first 
meeting between the government and corporate counsel.123  Corpora-
tions had to choose between saving themselves from indictment and 
maintaining the attorney-client privilege.  Often, corporations waived 
the privilege and allowed the government access to all of the infor-
mation about culpable employees.  Thus, employees began to be sac-
rificial lambs while corporations escaped without prosecution or with 
a deferred or non-prosecution agreement. 
The American Bar Association and many other groups pressured 
the DOJ to change its policy because it had created a “culture of 
waiver” within the business community.124  But the DOJ did not act 
until Senator Arlen Specter introduced legislation to protect the cor-
porate attorney-client privilege.125  The DOJ adopted a revised ver-
sion of the charging guidelines written by then-Deputy Attorney 
General Tom McNulty, which became known as the McNulty Memo-
randum.126  The McNulty Memorandum purported to restrict the 
government’s ability to request corporations to waive the attorney-
client privilege by requiring written authorization for waiver re-
quests.127  But the government was still permitted to consider a corpo-
ration’s refusal to waive the privilege in deciding whether the corpo-
 
 120. Copeland, Preserving, supra note 13, at 1211–12. 
 121. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 117, at VI. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Copeland, Preserving, supra note 13, at 1214.  
 124. See Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege: The Negative Impact 
for Clients, Corporate Compliance, and the American Legal System: Hearing Before 
the S. Jud. Comm., 109th Cong. 11 (2007) (statement of the Coalition to Preserve the 
Attorney-Client Privilege). 
 125. Senator Specter introduced the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act in 
2009. S. 445, 111th Cong. (2009).  For a detailed discussion of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege Protection Act, see Copeland, Preserving, supra note 13, at 1233–38. 
 126. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 118.   
 127. Id. at 10–11. 
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ration had cooperated with the investigation.128  The McNulty Memo-
randum also stated that prosecutors should not consider the payment 
of attorneys’ fees in determining a corporation’s cooperation.129 
In 2008, under continued pressure from Congress and several in-
terest groups, the DOJ amended its policy again.  Deputy Attorney 
General Mark Filip wrote the current policy which appears in the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual and is commonly known as the Filip 
Guidelines.  The Filip Guidelines prohibit the government from re-
questing waiver of the corporate attorney-client privilege or holding a 
refusal to waive the privilege against a corporation in assessing coop-
eration.130  Instead, the focus is on whether the corporation cooperat-
ed by sharing all of the facts it learned in its internal investigation.131  
There is still the danger, however, that sharing such facts could lead 
to an inadvertent waiver of the privilege.  Nevertheless, the change in 
policy was seen as a victory for the defense bar. 
This supposed victory, however, is not an indication that the gov-
ernment suddenly respects the corporate attorney-client privilege or 
looks upon defense lawyers favorably.  As Professor Peter Henning 
has explained, 
[T]here is . . . a trend towards using the criminal law and the gov-
ernment’s investigatory tools against lawyers because of what ap-
pears to be a deep-seated suspicion of legal advice as something 
harmful or inappropriate.  Lawyers commit crimes, and there is no 
claim that they should be exempt from the application of the crimi-
nal law.  But, at the same time, the presence of a lawyer is not a red 
flag or in any way nefarious.132 
The Stevens prosecution is the ultimate example of targeting an at-
torney for her legal advice.  In a brilliant move, the government 
charged Lauren Stevens with obstruction of justice for failing to turn 
over allegedly incriminating documents.  GSK’s investigation would 
ordinarily have been protected by the corporate attorney-client privi-
 
 128. Id. at 9. 
 129. Id. at 11. 
 130. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.710 (2011). 
 131. The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual states: 
[W]hat the government seeks and needs to advance its legitimate (indeed, 
essential) law enforcement mission is not waiver of [attorney client privilege 
and work product] protections, but rather the facts known to the corpora-
tion about the putative criminal misconduct under review . . . . The critical 
factor is whether the corporation has provided the facts about the events . . . 
.   
Id.  
 132. Henning, Targeting, supra note 114, at 674–75.  
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lege.  The government claimed that GSK instructed Stevens to cover 
up wrongdoing and thwart the government investigation.  As a result 
of this claim, the government convinced a magistrate judge that the 
crime fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied and that 
the government should have had access to all of the privileged docu-
ments that dealt with GSK’s response to the government inquiry.  
Consequently, the government gained insight into GSK’s promotional 
activities that would ordinarily be unavailable. 
By targeting the general counsel, the government sends the mes-
sage that cooperation is not only appreciated, it is required.  Unlike in 
the pre-Filip Guidelines era, however, the touchstone of cooperation 
is not waiver of the attorney-client privilege.133  In this situation, co-
operation means turning over all documents, no matter how incrimi-
nating, at an early stage in the investigation when there is no legal ob-
ligation to do so.  Failure to cooperate in this manner leads to 
obstruction of justice charges against in-house counsel and piercing 
the corporate attorney-client privilege based on the crime-fraud ex-
ception.  Although the government was not successful in this case, 
prosecutors may attempt this strategy in a future case where they be-
lieve the failure to cooperate is more egregious. 
5. Conclusion 
The Stevens prosecution does not fit neatly into the scheme of 
prosecutions of responsible corporate officers or gatekeepers.  Nor do 
the government’s use of pretextual prosecutions or its disdain for the 
corporate attorney-client privilege explain Stevens’ prosecution.  But 
there are aspects of the Stevens prosecution that both reflect and ex-
pand the reach of each of these trends.  If the government had not 
found success by pursuing responsible corporate officers and in-house 
counsel as gatekeepers, it is unlikely they would have taken the risk 
of pursuing Stevens for her conduct during the GSK investigation.  
Further, the government’s successful use of pretextual prosecutions as 
a means of punishing individuals who committed complex crimes cer-
tainly encouraged them to expand their use of pretextual prosecu-
tions as a critical law enforcement tool.  Finally, it is hard to imagine 
that the government would vigorously pursue in-house counsel by in-
voking the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege if 
they did not find attorney-client privileged documents critical to suc-
cessful prosecutions. 
 
 133. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.710. 
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II.  THE LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 
A. Misguided as a Matter of Law 
The government should not have charged Lauren Stevens with ob-
struction of justice or false statements for her actions during the 
FDA’s investigation of GSK.  In fact, the government should never 
have received the attorney-client privileged documents that made the 
indictment possible.  Stevens, on behalf of GSK, responded to a vol-
untary request for information.  In the absence of a civil investigative 
demand or subpoena, GSK did not have a legal obligation to provide 
information on its marketing activities for Wellbutrin.  In addition, 
Stevens’ conduct during the investigation did not meet the standard 
of obstruction.  Further, Stevens had meritorious defenses to her con-
duct that should have counseled the government against charging her.  
Not only did Stevens’ conduct fit into the safe harbor provision of ob-
struction of justice, but she also relied upon the advice of outside 
counsel when she responded to the government’s inquiry.  This Part 
will address the government’s improper access to the evidence via the 
crime-fraud exception, the obstruction of justice counts and the safe 
harbor provision, and the advice of counsel defense.134 
1. The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The government improperly obtained the evidence that they used 
to prosecute Stevens for obstruction of justice by invoking the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.135  The crime-fraud 
 
 134. This Article does not fully address the false statement charges because they 
are incredibly fact specific and cannot be generalized to further the discussion of 
whether an attorney should be charged for this type of pre-indictment conduct.  Fur-
ther, some of the obstruction charges incorporate the alleged false statements and 
will be addressed in the obstruction of justice section making a separate discussion on 
false statements redundant.    
 135. The attorney-client privilege protects a client’s confidential communications 
with counsel from disclosure to third parties.  The purpose of the privilege is to en-
courage “full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients” to 
“promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of jus-
tice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  In short, the privilege 
allows clients to speak openly with their attorneys about their problems without fear 
that whatever they tell their attorneys will be disclosed to others.  When attorneys are 
fully informed about their clients’ circumstances, they are able to provide compre-
hensive legal advice and act effectively on their clients’ behalf. Susan W. Crump, The 
Attorney-Client Privilege and Other Ethical Issues in the Corporate Context Where 
There is Widespread Fraud or Criminal Conduct, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 171, 173 (2003) 
(citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or 
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the law-
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exception permits prosecutors or other litigants to gain access to oth-
erwise confidential attorney-client communications that took place 
for the purpose of furthering an intended crime or fraud.136  The goal 
of the exception is to prevent clients from misusing the attorney-client 
privilege to further their future unlawful actions.137  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Clark v. United States, “[a] client who consults an at-
torney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will 
have no help from the law.  He must let the truth be told.”138  But a 
client who consults an attorney after a government inquiry is initiat-
ed, like GSK, is entitled to confidentiality. 
It is permissible and even desirable for someone to seek legal ad-
vice in advance of taking a particular course of action.  In those situa-
tions, the client needs to have the freedom to disclose all of the perti-
nent facts to the attorney.  Without full disclosure, attorneys will be 
severely hampered in performing their functions.  Further, it is ap-
propriate to seek legal representation after one has been charged with 
a crime or charges are imminent.  The crime-fraud exception falls be-
tween these two extremes—seeking legal advice so that your actions 
conform with the law and seeking legal counsel after you are charged 
with a crime.  It aims to prevent clients from consulting lawyers in 
contemplation of a crime or fraud.139 
All the policy reasons that support the existence of the privilege are 
said to cease as the line is crossed from legal advice given on how 
one may conform one’s actions to the requirements of the law or to 
assistance in defending oneself against the consequences of one’s 
past actions into the domain of contemplated or actual illegal ac-
tion.140 
The difficulty lies in distinguishing between “legal advice in defense 
of a past crime or fraud and a cover-up of a past crime or fraud.”141  If 
the distinction is not appropriately drawn, however, the privilege will 
 
yer’s being fully informed by the client.”)).  Because the attorney-client privilege 
shields potentially probative evidence, it is construed narrowly.  Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege only ap-
plies “where necessary to achieve its purpose”).  
 136. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 418–19. 
 137. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) (explaining that the pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege is defeated when the attorney’s advice refers to 
future unlawful conduct rather than past unlawful conduct). 
 138. 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). 
 139. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 419. 
 140. Id. at 420. 
 141. Id. at 422.  
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be lost completely any time an attorney is defending someone ac-
cused of a crime or fraud.142 
With respect to whether there is an intended crime or fraud, it is 
the client’s intent at the time of the attorney-client communication 
that controls.143  Thus, the attorney need not have knowledge that the 
client intends to use the attorney’s advice in furtherance of a crime or 
fraud to pierce the privilege.144  Nevertheless, as Professor David 
Fried has noted, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the cli-
ent’s reason for consulting a lawyer “without knowing what facts the 
client disclosed; whether the facts varied, intentionally or otherwise, 
from the truth; what the attorney advised; and whether the client took 
the attorney’s advice.”145 
To raise the crime-fraud exception, the proponent must put forth 
sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing that the party in 
question committed a crime or fraud.146  It is not enough, however, to 
show that allegations of misconduct exist or even that the party to the 
communication is under grand jury investigation.  Without a showing 
of an underlying crime or fraud, the proponent cannot invoke this ex-
ception.147  Once the proponent makes this threshold showing, he or 
she is required to introduce a prima facie case, demonstrating “(1) 
that the client was engag[ed] in (or was planning) criminal or fraudu-
lent activity when the attorney-client communications took place; and 
(2) that the communications were intended by the client to facilitate 
or conceal the criminal or fraudulent activity.”148 
Not surprisingly, courts have struggled with deciding the amount 
and type of evidence that must be shown to satisfy the court that the 
privilege does not apply.149  There is no requirement that the evidence 
 
 142. Id.  
 143. H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege in the Context of Corporate Counseling, 87 KY. L.J. 1191, 1230 (1999). 
 144. Id. at 1231.   
 145. David J. Fried, Too High a Price for the Truth: The Exception to the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 444–
45 (1986). 
 146. Brown, supra note 143, at 1225.  
 147. Id. at 1226. 
 148. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 149. Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown the 
Privilege?: Exploring the Application of the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 585 (2003) (explaining that courts are 
grappling with the quantum of evidence needed to overcome the privilege, whether 
the attorney-client communication can meet the burden, and whether the judge 
should do an in camera inspection to make the determination); Christopher Paul 
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be independent of the allegedly privileged communications.150  Nor is 
there a requirement that the evidence presented be competent and 
admissible.151  Instead, in United States v. Zolin152 the Supreme Court 
permitted the content of the allegedly privileged communications to 
be examined to determine whether the crime-fraud exception ap-
plied.  While declining to impose a blanket rule permitting in camera 
review of privileged communications, the Court found that “before a 
district court may engage in in camera review at the request of the 
party opposing the privilege, that party must present evidence suffi-
cient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review may yield 
evidence that establishes the exception’s applicability.”153  Thus, after 
the Zolin decision, the confidentiality of the communications may be 
violated as part of the determination of whether the communications 
were made in furtherance of a crime or fraud.  It matters little that the 
judge will subject the documents to in camera inspection before he 
turns them over to opposing counsel because even if the judge deter-
mines that the communications do not support a finding of crime or 
fraud, the judge cannot unlearn what he discovered during in camera 
review. 
The implications of a finding of crime or fraud are far reaching for 
the client.  If the court determines that the proponent has adequately 
proven the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, then all of the 
communications with counsel that assisted the client in perpetrating 
the crime or fraud lack the protection of the attorney-client privi-
lege.154  As a result, the prosecutor will be able to obtain an indict-
ment based on incriminating evidence provided by the attorney as 
well as any other evidence of the crime that the prosecutor pos-
sessed.155  Indeed, the attorney may be required to testify before the 
 
Galanek, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on the Crime-Fraud Exception to the At-
torney-Client Privilege, 24 GA. L. REV. 1115, 1124–25 (1990). 
 150. Daily & Thornquist, supra note 149, at 588–89 (explaining that the Ninth Cir-
cuit once took the position that independent evidence was required, but that it has 
not been followed).   
 151. Id. at 589 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit required that evidence be admissi-
ble but it has not been followed because district courts need not follow the rules of 
evidence when determining the applicability of privileges).   
 152. 491 U.S. 554 (1989). 
 153. Id. at 574–75.   
 154. Cary Bricker, Revisiting the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client 
Privilege: A Proposal to Remedy the Disparity in Protections for Civil and Criminal 
Privilege Holders, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 149, 163–64 (2009).      
 155. Id. at 164.   
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grand jury about communications between the client and the attor-
ney.156 
In Stevens’ case, the prosecution never should have been able to 
pierce the corporate attorney-client privilege by claiming that GSK 
was engaged in a crime or fraud.  First, even assuming that GSK 
committed a crime by engaging in off-label promotion, there was ab-
solutely no evidence to support the theory that they consulted Ste-
vens before they engaged in that conduct with the intent to commit a 
crime.  Second, there was very little evidence to support the theory 
that Stevens was consulted for the purpose of engaging in a cover-up 
crime to hide the off-label promotion.  The only evidence that sup-
ported the government’s cover-up theory was that Stevens, on behalf 
of GSK, did not turn over all of the allegedly incriminating docu-
ments in response to the voluntary request for information.157  The 
government learned that some documents were held back from the 
whistleblower and the fact that the documents were later disclosed af-
ter the issuance of a subpoena.158  It is also possible that the govern-
ment presented some evidence ex parte, but the magistrate judge who 
granted the government access to the attorney-client privileged doc-
uments did not prepare a written opinion.  Perhaps the circumstantial 
evidence was sufficient under Zolin to warrant in camera review of 
the attorney-client privileged documents to determine whether the 
exception applied.  After all, the standard is quite low and it is in the 
judge’s discretion whether to grant the in camera review.159  But it is 
difficult to understand why the judge decided that the crime-fraud ex-
ception applied after the judge reviewed the attorney-client privileged 
communications.  As Judge Titus said, “the privileged documents in 
this case show a studied, thoughtful analysis of an extremely broad 
request from the Food and Drug Administration and an enormous ef-
fort to assemble information and respond on behalf of the client.”160  
Further, the attorney-client communications did not reveal that the 
client, GSK, wanted Lauren Stevens to engage in a cover-up.161  In 
short, there was no support for the notion that GSK asked Stevens to 
do anything other than lead the investigative team and respond to the 
FDA’s voluntary request for information.  Further, the evidence 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 11. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 160. Stevens Transcript, supra note 1, at 5.   
 161. Id. 
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failed to demonstrate that Stevens acted in bad faith when responding 
to the FDA.  Thus, the government never should have gained access 
to GSK’s privileged documents. 
If the corporate attorney-client privilege can be pierced in a case 
like this where the government is not satisfied with the defendant’s 
response to a voluntary request for information, what is left of the 
privilege?  Certainly, the government should not be able to invoke 
the crime-fraud exception anytime it disagrees with the defense about 
the scope of and appropriate response to a request for information.  
These types of disputes are an inevitable part of litigation.  The de-
fense will always read the request for information or subpoena as nar-
rowly as possible and the government will always read it as broadly as 
possible.  That is the nature of the adversarial process.  To grant the 
government access to attorney-client privileged documents in a case 
such as this turns the attorney-client privilege on its head.  Any time 
there is a dispute, the presumption of privilege would be transformed 
into a presumption against the privilege.  That would have profound 
implications for both the attorney and the client because the attorney 
would no longer be able to promise confidentiality. 
2. Obstruction of Justice 
The prosecutor charged Stevens with obstruction of justice for (1) 
failing to turn over documents; (2) claiming that the production was 
complete even though she withheld responsive documents; and (3) al-
tering a chart that contained speaker compensation to remove the en-
tertainment expenses.162  Because the alleged misconduct took place 
before an indictment was issued, the government proceeded under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1512 and 1519.  Both of those sections are potentially appli-
cable to attorney conduct during an internal investigation.163 
 
 162. See Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 13–16. 
 163. Section 1503, the Omnibus Provision, is the obstruction statute that is used the 
most often because it has the broadest reach.  The Omnibus Provision is concerned 
with obstruction by attempting to influence jurors or officers in a judicial proceeding 
and obstruction of the “due administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2008).  It 
provides that “[w]hoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening 
letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice . . . shall be punished.” Id.  Be-
cause § 1503 has been interpreted to require a pending judicial proceeding, however, 
it is not the easiest route to charge an attorney for conduct that took place during an 
internal investigation which ordinarily occurs in the pre-indictment stage. See United 
States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (explaining that it is not enough that actions 
were taken to influence an investigation; there must be knowledge of a pending pro-
ceeding for a person to have the evil intent to obstruct).  The Omnibus Provision 
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Section 1512 was enacted to prevent tampering with a witness, vic-
tim, or informant.164  Congress added § 1512(c) to the obstruction 
statutes as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002165 to deal with doc-
ument destruction in the wake of the Arthur Anderson case.166  Un-
der § 1512(c), liability is imposed on anyone who “corruptly (1) alters, 
destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, 
or attempts to do so . . . ; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or im-
pedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so . . . .”167  Thus, un-
der the amended version of § 1512, the government can prosecute the 
individual who alters the documents as well as the person who induc-
es her to do so. 
Section 1519 was also enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to 
address the destruction, alteration or falsification of documents in 
federal investigations.168  It provides that: 
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, 
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible 
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investiga-
tion or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of 
any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined un-
der this title, imprisoned . . . or both.169 
 
could apply to the concealment, alteration, or destruction of subpoenaed documents 
because a grand jury would have issued the subpoena. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  
Some courts have held, however, that concealment and destruction of documents 
likely to be sought by subpoena is actionable under § 1503 if the person knows of the 
pending proceeding before the subpoena is issued. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  Much like § 1503, § 1505’s Omnibus 
Provision, which addresses obstruction of agency or Congressional proceedings, has a 
requirement of a pending proceeding that could preclude its use for an attorney’s 
conduct during an internal investigation.  18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2008).  For a detailed dis-
cussion of all of the obstruction of justice provisions and their ability to address doc-
ument destruction at various stages in litigation, see generally Chase, supra note 101. 
 164. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  As originally enacted, however, it only prevented 
causing or inducing any person to (1) withhold testimony; (2) alter, destroy, or con-
ceal an object; (3) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness 
or produce a record or document; or (4) be absent from an official proceeding for 
which that person has been summoned. Chase, supra note 101, at 739–40.  Thus, it 
did not cover a situation where an individual withheld testimony or destroyed evi-
dence on her own accord. See id.  
 165. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong., 116 Stat. 745, 807 (2002). 
 166. Kasprisin, supra note 101, at 878–79. 
 167. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2006). 
 168. Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title VII § 802(a), 116 Stat. 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
1519). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006). 
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Section 1519 is meant to be broader than the other obstruction 
statutes.  Section 1519 prohibits acts that interfere with pending inves-
tigations and acts performed “in relation to or in contemplation of” 
any matter before an agency.170  Thus, there is no requirement of a 
“pending proceeding” as in the other obstruction statutes.  Section 
1519 covers any situation where evidence may be altered, thus mak-
ing the crime easier to prove.171  Further, the sentence of twenty years 
makes it a desirable statute to use.172 
Importantly, there is a defense to obstruction of justice charges 
where the allegedly obstructive conduct occurs while providing bona 
fide legal services.  Section 1515(c), which is known as the “safe har-
bor,” provides, “[t]his chapter does not prohibit or punish the provid-
ing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection 
with or anticipation of an official proceeding.”173  The safe harbor ne-
gates the mental element of the offense because someone “who is 
performing bona fide legal representation does not have an improper 
purpose.”174  The defendant-lawyer bears the burden of raising the 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Kasprisin, supra note 101, at 883–85 (explaining that under § 1519, the de-
fendant must act knowingly rather than corruptly and that the knowledge that is re-
quired is not of the pending federal proceeding, but simply that “the person knew 
they were altering, destroying, mutilating, concealing, covering up, falsifying, or mak-
ing a false entry in a document, record, or tangible object”).      
 172. 18 U.S.C. § 1519.   
 173. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c) (1996). 
 174. United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2001).  Kloess was an at-
torney charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) for obstruction of justice when 
he knowingly misled the Court regarding the true identity of his client to conceal a 
probation violation. Kloess, 251 F.3d at 943.  Kloess’s client, Gene Easterling, was on 
probation for a federal offense when he was stopped for a traffic violation and found 
to be in possession of a gun, which violated his probation.  Easterling provided the 
police with a driver’s license showing the name Craig Wallace and he was subse-
quently charged under that name.  Kloess then entered a plea of guilty in absentia for 
him under the name Craig Wallace.  The obstruction charges were based on Kloess’ 
knowledge that his client’s name was really Gene Easterling.  The claim was that he 
concealed his client’s true identity to hide Easterling’s probation violation.  Kloess 
moved to dismiss the indictment because he claimed that it did not include an essen-
tial element found in a safe harbor provision of a separate section, § 1515(c), which 
protected attorneys providing bona fide legal representation services from liability 
for obstruction. Id. at 943–44  Thus, Kloess argued the government had to plead and 
prove that his conduct did not fall within the protection of the safe harbor provision. 
Id.  The district court granted Kloess’ motion to dismiss the indictment because it 
found that the burden should be on the government.  The government appealed the 
dismissal. Id. at 944.  The Eleventh Circuit found that the safe harbor was an affirma-
tive defense that negated the mental state of obstruction.  Thus, the burden of pro-
duction for the safe harbor defense was on the defendant-attorney, but that the bur-
den of proof was on the government at all times. Id. at 949. 
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defense and demonstrating that she is entitled to its protection.175  
Once the defendant lawyer has properly raised that defense, however, 
the government bears the burden of disproving the defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.176 
The government argued that the safe harbor did not apply to Ste-
vens because her conduct assisted GSK in the commission of a 
crime.177  Presumably, Stevens allegedly assisted GSK in committing 
obstruction of justice.  The question, however, is not whether Stevens’ 
conduct hindered the government’s investigation of GSK; it is wheth-
er her conduct was taken as part of a bona fide legal representation.  
This distinction is critical because many lawful actions that attorneys 
take impede government investigations.  The safe harbor would not 
serve any purpose if a finding that an attorney’s actions hindered the 
investigation was enough to defeat it. 
The important question is whether the attorney took the actions 
for an improper purpose.  The government bears the burden of prov-
ing an improper purpose beyond a reasonable doubt.  GSK asked 
Stevens, in her capacity as general counsel, to head an investigative 
team to respond to the FDA’s voluntary request for information.178  
In the course of the investigation, Stevens made decisions and judg-
ments in responding to the FDA’s inquiry.179  The government argued 
that “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant took de-
liberate action to conceal the relevant facts from the FDA, while cre-
ating the appearance of cooperation and candor.”180  The mere fact 
that the government did not agree with Stevens’ decisions, however, 
does not demonstrate that she acted with an improper purpose.  The 
only thing that the government proved was that Stevens was a zealous 
advocate on behalf of GSK.  There is an inevitable conflict between a 
 
 175. Id. at 948–49.  The defendant-attorney’s burden can be met by demonstrating 
that she is a validly licensed attorney who was hired to provide legal representation 
and that the charged conduct consists of that representation. Id.  In some situations, 
the defendant-attorney’s burden of production is met by the allegations in the in-
dictment. Id. at 948 n.8.  The attorney is entitled to have an expert who will explain 
that the lawyer’s conduct was actually in line with her ethical obligations to her client 
and her duty to provide zealous advocacy. Id. at 949; see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT Canon 2 (2010) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the cli-
ent’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”).   
 176. Kloess, 251 F.3d at 949. 
 177. United States’ Initial Response to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Ac-
quittal at 10, United States v. Stevens, No. 10-CR-694-RWT (D. Md. May 9, 2011) 
[hereinafter United States’ Initial Response]. 
 178. Stevens Transcript, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 179. Id. at 5. 
 180. United States’ Initial Response, supra note 177, at 8. 
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lawyer’s duty to be a zealous advocate and the government’s efforts 
to obtain facts.  As Stevens’ lawyers argued in her motion for a judg-
ment of acquittal, it is the lawyer’s duty “to defend her client, to min-
imize her client’s exposure, to press for advantage where possible, to 
seek advice where advisable, and to exercise judgment in doing so.  It 
is to protect this exercise of judgment, and of zealous advocacy, that 
the § 1515(c) safe harbor exists.”181  Thus, Stevens had an absolute de-
fense to the obstruction of justice charges. 
Even if the safe harbor did not apply, however, the government did 
not demonstrate that Stevens obstructed justice.  The government 
charged Stevens with obstruction of a proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(c)(2).182  The government alleged that by withholding and con-
cealing documents that allegedly demonstrated that GSK had pro-
moted Wellbutrin for unapproved uses, Stevens “attempted to and 
did corruptly obstruct, influence, and impede an official proceed-
ing.”183  Further, the government alleged that Stevens impeded the of-
ficial proceeding by sending a letter to the FDA stating that she had 
completed the response to the government’s inquiry.184 The govern-
ment also charged Lauren Stevens with obstruction of justice by falsi-
fying and concealing documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for altering a 
spreadsheet that she created for the government.185  Each of these 
charges is without merit. 
The government sent GSK a voluntary request for information.  In 
addition to gathering GSK’s documents, the government requested 
that Stevens gather documents that were not in GSK’s possession 
from doctors who assisted GSK in promoting Wellbutrin.186  Ordinari-
ly, an entity is only responsible for gathering the documents in its own 
possession.187  When some of those documents demonstrated that a 
number of doctors were promoting Wellbutrin off-label, Stevens con-
 
 181. Stevens’ Motion for Acquittal, supra note 42, at 18.  
 182. Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 13.  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 14. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. at 3–5. 
 187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) (explaining that the obligation to produce docu-
ments extends to those documents that are in the responding party’s “possession, cus-
tody, or control”).  In some cases, courts have interpreted Rule 34’s “possession, cus-
tody, or control” provision to include documents that the responding party has the 
legal right or practical ability to obtain. See, e.g., Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 
653–54 (11th Cir. 1984).  The requests at issue in those cases, however, were part of 
the formal civil discovery process where legal sanctions are available for the failure to 
produce documents.  The Stevens case involves a voluntary request for information.   
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sulted with outside counsel to determine whether she was required to 
produce the documents.188  Outside counsel advised her that she did 
not have to produce the documents.189  Thus, Stevens asserted that 
the production was complete.  The government interpreted Stevens’ 
assertion to mean that GSK had turned over every potentially re-
sponsive document that the FDA requested.  But, it could also mean 
that GSK had produced all of the documents that it intended to turn 
over in response to the voluntary request for information.  Perhaps 
Stevens should have been clearer in her letter.  A lack of clarity, how-
ever, is not enough to demonstrate “corrupt” concealment.  Con-
cealment requires some act to prevent detection or hide the docu-
ments.190  The government knew that the documents existed and that 
they were not produced.  Stevens did not engage in any effort to con-
vince the government that the documents did not exist. 
Further, the statement that “[a]lthough there were isolated defi-
ciencies, the objective evidence clearly demonstrates that GSK has 
not developed, maintained, or encouraged promotional plans or activ-
ities to promote, directly or indirectly, Wellbutrin SR for weight loss, 
the treatment of obesity, or any other unapproved indication,” is de-
fensible.191  First, GSK does not deny that there were cases of doctors 
or employees of GSK who promoted Wellbutrin off-label.  Instead, 
GSK acknowledges that there were off-label promotional activities by 
 
 188. When deciding whether to produce presentation materials by physicians who 
had given promotional presentations regarding Wellbutrin, Stevens had other law-
yers involved in the case prepare a memorandum regarding the pros and cons of pro-
ducing the slide sets to the FDA. Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 10.  In the 
“Pros” category, the attorneys said: (1) that it “[r]esponds to FDA’s request 5(a) for 
copies of all materials presented by individuals identified in response to item 3 and 
relating to Wellbutrin SR”; and (2) that it “[p]otentially garners credibility with 
FDA.” Id.  In the “Cons” category, the attorneys said: (1) that it “[p]rovides infor-
mation that appears to promote off-label uses of Wellbutrin for weight loss as well as 
ADHD, sexual dysfunction, and other unapproved uses;” (2) that it “[p]otentially 
demonstrates GSK’s lack of control over GSK sales representatives;” (3) that it 
“[p]otentially demonstrates GSK’s lack of control over physician speakers;” and (4) 
that it “[p]rovides incriminating evidence about potential off-label promotion of 
Wellbutrin SR that may be used against GSK in this or in a future investigation.” Id. 
 189. Stevens’ Motion for Acquittal, supra note 42, at 8–9.  
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Lench, 806 F.2d 1443, 1446–47 (9th Cir. 1986) (up-
holding obstruction of justice conviction for defendant who concealed documents re-
quested in a subpoena by moving them to his garage in anticipation of a search and 
denying their existence); United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 466 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(contrasting “concealment” with “mere failure to produce the documents” requested 
in the subpoena). 
 191. Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 12. 
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admitting “isolated deficiencies.”192  In fact, one could argue that by 
calling the off-label activities “isolated deficiencies,” GSK was merely 
attempting to distinguish itself from the pharmaceutical companies 
that intentionally promoted their drugs off-label through concerted 
marketing efforts.193  Second, apart from the merits of the statement, 
it is nothing more than a legal conclusion.  It is pure advocacy.  It is 
well within the bounds of the ethics rules to advocate on behalf of a 
client in this manner.  Although reliance is not an element of the of-
fense, the notion that a prosecutor will be obstructed in his investiga-
tion based on a legal conclusion asserted by the defense is far-fetched 
at best.  Indeed, if Stevens’ statement is objectionable as “false” or 
“obstruction,” then any statement in a brief that comes to a legal con-
clusion contrary to the government’s position is also actionable.  
When attorneys have to be concerned with making legal conclusions 
in advocating for their clients, we have a complete breakdown of the 
adversarial system of justice. 
Finally, the government’s claim that Stevens obstructed justice by 
falsifying a document is similarly without merit.  The FDA requested 
that Stevens create a promotional speaker spreadsheet that detailed 
speaker events.194  An early draft of the document had a column for 
entertainment activities, but after consultation with outside counsel 
Stevens removed it.195  Thus, the claim that Stevens obstructed justice 
by falsifying a document rests on the fact that she edited a document 
that she created at the government’s request before turning it over to 
the government.  Importantly, it is not predicated on the falsity of the 
information provided in the document.  The government made no 
claim that the information that Stevens provided in the spreadsheet 
was inaccurate.  GSK delivered exactly what it promised—“databases 
listing all speaker events including the date, location, speaker, and 
where available, the number of attendees.”196  Thus, there is no basis 
for the government’s claim that Stevens falsified the document. 
In sum, Lauren Stevens did not obstruct the government’s investi-
gation into GSK.  While she may not have produced documents that 
could have potentially incriminated her client in response to a volun-
tary request for information, her actions lacked the corrupt intent 
 
 192. Id.  
 193. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the inappropriate mar-
keting practices of pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
 194. Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 9. 
 195. Stevens’ Motion for Acquittal, supra note 42, at 13.  
 196. Id. at 12. 
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necessary for obstruction of justice.  Stevens provided bona fide legal 
services to GSK during the course of the investigation.  The govern-
ment may have wanted more documents, but Stevens was not obli-
gated to provide the documents because it was a voluntary request for 
information.  There is no claim that Stevens failed to turn over the 
documents at issue when she faced a subpoena.  Thus, unless obstruc-
tion of justice is interpreted to mean a failure to produce documents 
when there is no legal obligation to do so, Stevens did not obstruct 
justice. 
3. The Advice of Counsel Defense 
Because Judge Titus granted Stevens’ motion for judgment of ac-
quittal at the close of the prosecution’s case, Stevens never had to 
present her advice of counsel defense.  Nevertheless, the advice of 
counsel was central to the case and was heavily litigated in the pre-
trial stage.197  In fact, the original indictment was dismissed without 
prejudice because of the prosecutor’s “erroneous and prejudicial legal 
advice given to the grand jury” about the advice of counsel defense.198 
Stevens claimed that she relied on the advice of outside counsel 
when she responded to the government inquiry on behalf of GSK.199  
Reliance on the advice of counsel is only applicable if the charged of-
fense is a specific intent crime.200  The government argued that the de-
 
 197. See, e.g., United States’ Motion to Preclude Advice of Counsel Def. to 18 
U.S.C. § 1519 and for Hearing Regarding the Applicability of the Def. to Other 
Charges, United States v. Stevens, No. RWT-10-0694 (D. Md. Dec. 17, 2010) [herein-
after United States’ Motion to Preclude Advice] (arguing that Stevens should not be 
permitted to raise the advice of counsel defense). 
 198. United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (D. Md. 2011).  A grand ju-
ror asked the prosecutor whether it mattered that Stevens “was getting direction 
from somebody else about how to handle this?” Id.  The prosecutor responded that 
“the advice of counsel defense . . . is a defense that a defendant can raise, once the 
defendant has been charged.” Id.  Another prosecutor responded that “while [the ad-
vice of defense counsel] can be relevant at trial . . . if you find probable cause for the 
elements here that the attorney Lauren Stevens reasonably knew that she was mak-
ing false statements and the elements that Patrick [Jasperse] went through, then 
that’s sufficient to find probable cause.” Id. at 565.  The court found that the instruc-
tion was erroneous because the grand jurors were told that the defense was irrelevant 
to whether probable cause existed for an indictment. Id. at 568.  The court explained 
that the advice of counsel defense negates the mens rea requirement and that is rele-
vant to the question of whether there is probable cause for an indictment. Id. at 567. 
 199. See United States’ Motion to Preclude Advice, supra note 197, at 3. 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Miller, 658 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Polytarides, 584 
F.2d 1350, 1353 (4th Cir. 1978).  A specific intent crime “‘is one in which the defini-
tion of the crime: (1) includes an intent to do some future act, or achieve some fur-
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fense was not applicable because obstruction of justice under 18 
U.S.C. § 1519 is not a specific intent crime.201  The court, however, 
ruled against the government on this point because the statute re-
quires that the individual must knowingly alter or destroy documents 
“with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation.”202  
The court found that the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence satis-
fies the specific intent requirement because it demonstrates “con-
sciousness of wrongdoing.”203  Thus, the advice of counsel defense 
was available to Stevens. 
If an individual or entity relies on the advice of its lawyer, the indi-
vidual or entity has acted in good faith, which negates the mens rea of 
the crime.204  To assert an advice of counsel defense, the person or en-
tity must prove the following factors: (1) the person or entity sought 
counsel’s advice in good faith; (2) the person or entity disclosed all 
pertinent information to counsel; (3) the person or entity acted on 
counsel’s advice in good faith; and (4) the attorney was competent in 
the particular area of law and disinterested in the matter.205 
There can be no question that Stevens sought the advice of both in-
house and outside counsel for the purpose of responding to the 
FDA’s inquiry.  To claim otherwise would be problematic, given that 
the government had no evidence to the contrary despite the fact that 
it viewed attorney-client privileged documents as part of its investiga-
tion.  It is also likely that Stevens provided outside counsel with all of 
the documents and relevant facts because it is normal practice in an 
internal investigation for outside counsel to be heavily involved in the 
production of documents.  This is true even when the production ap-
pears to come from in-house counsel.  Further, the privileged docu-
ments demonstrate the government’s awareness of the slide sets that 
the government claims were concealed and the document that the 
government claims was altered.206  In fact, it is clear from the privi-
 
ther consequence (i.e., a special motive for conduct), beyond the conduct or result 
that constitutes the actus reus of the offense; or (2) provides that the actor must be 
aware of a statutory attendant circumstance.’” O’SULLIVAN, supra note 59, at 95 
(quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 119 (1995)).  
 201. See United States’ Motion to Preclude Advice, supra note 197, at 6–7 (arguing 
that the mens rea requirement for obstruction under § 1519 is knowingly, not willful-
ly, therefore there is no specific intent requirement). 
 202. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002). 
 203. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
 204. O’SULLIVAN, supra note 59, at 98. 
 205. United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 206. See supra note 188 (discussing the pro-con memo prepared by outside counsel 
when weighing whether to produce the documents).   
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leged documents that outside counsel advised Stevens not to produce 
the documents and to remove the “entertainment” column from the 
document that Stevens created for the government.207  The removal 
of that column is the basis for the claim that Stevens obstructed jus-
tice by altering a document.  Nevertheless, the government argues 
that any reliance on the advice of counsel would have been improper 
because counsel advised Stevens to “make false statements to the 
FDA and to conceal promised documents and information from the 
FDA while representing that her response to the FDA was final and 
complete.”208  Given that Stevens was responding to a voluntary re-
quest for information, however, Stevens would not have any reason to 
believe that following outside counsel’s advice with respect to produc-
ing documents was illegal.  Stevens had no legal obligation to provide 
any documents to the government.209  Further, GSK’s outside counsel 
included two former FDA attorneys.210  It is perfectly reasonable that 
Stevens would rely upon their considerable expertise in determining 
how to respond to the government’s request.  Thus, the Stevens case 
never even should have made it to the indictment stage because it was 
clear that she had relied in good faith on the advice of counsel.  As 
such, she did not have an improper purpose or act with consciousness 
of wrongdoing when she responded to the FDA’s voluntary request 
for information. 
 
 207. Stevens’ Motion for Acquittal, supra note 42, at 14 (citing government exhib-
its).  Outside counsel’s notes reflected that “entertainment” should be kept out of the 
spreadsheet. Id. at 13.  Outside counsel’s notes also indicated that she “should NOT 
produce these presentations.” Id. at 9.  
 208. United States’ Motion to Preclude Advice, supra note 197, at 16. 
 209. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require compliance with a subpoena 
and provide sanctions for failure to comply with the subpoena. See FED. R. CRIM. 
PRO. 17.  Similarly, the United States Code requires compliance with civil investiga-
tive demands and provides sanctions for failure to comply. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733 
(2010).  There is no similar requirement for a voluntary request for information.  
When a corporation refuses to comply with a voluntary request for information the 
next step is to issue a subpoena. See, e.g., Matthew Daly, EPA: Halliburton Issued 
Subpoena for Refusing to Disclose Hydraulic Fracturing, ‘Fracking,’ Chemical Ingre-
dients, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 9, 2010, 5:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/11/09/epa-halliburton-subpoenae_n_781045.html (explaining that after Hallibur-
ton’s refusal to voluntarily provide information regarding fracking the EPA issued a 
subpoena to force Halliburton to produce the documents). 
 210. Stevens’ Motion for Acquittal, supra note 42, at 8. 
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B. Misguided as a Matter of Policy 
1. The Adversarial System of Justice 
The government bears some responsibility here.  The government 
has become so reliant on the “cooperation” of the targets of their in-
vestigations that they often do not perform a truly independent inves-
tigation.  Instead, corporate attorneys are put in the position of con-
ducting internal investigations of their clients and then reporting the 
results to the government.  Many scholars have discussed the disturb-
ing trend of prosecutors “deputizing” defense attorneys during the 
course of government investigations.211  A defense attorney, however, 
is not a government agent.  A defense attorney owes a duty of loyalty 
to her client.212  It defies the role of defense counsel to expect them to 
be objective reporters of a client’s wrongdoing to the government.  
Defense counsel’s fundamental objective is to prevent a client from 
facing criminal charges.  Thus, defense attorneys attempt to control 
the information that is revealed to the government to minimize or 
prevent charges against their clients.  Even once all of the information 
is revealed, defense counsel attempts to persuade the government not 
to indict her client by preparing a white paper and arguing that the 
client’s actions do not rise to the level of criminal activity. 
If the prosecution of Lauren Stevens had been successful, it would 
have essentially stripped away an attorney’s role as an advocate dur-
ing a government investigation.  The government expects an attorney 
to turn over all documents that incriminate her client even when they 
are not compelled to do so by court order.  The DOJ has explained 
that “[w]hen misconduct is discovered, the Department expects cor-
porations to self-report to law enforcement, including any regulators, 
 
 211. See, e.g., Copeland, Preserving, supra note 13, at 1208; George Ellard, Making 
the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 985, 998 (2005); Law-
rence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputization 
of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 117 (2003); Julie R. O’Sullivan, The 
Last Straw: The Department of Justice’s Privilege Waiver Policy and the Death of 
Adversarial Justice in Criminal Investigations of Corporations, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
329, 329, 336 (2008). 
 212. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Representation of a 
criminal defendant entails certain basic duties.  Counsel’s function is to assist the de-
fendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest.  From counsel’s function as assistant to the defendant derive the over-
arching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to con-
sult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed 
of important developments in the course of the prosecution.  Counsel also has a duty 
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial 
testing process.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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to investigate the misconduct, to discipline any wrongdoers, and to 
cooperate fully with government investigations.”213 
Perhaps, in some cases, it is in the best interests of the client to turn 
over everything and hope for cooperation credit.  But there is no re-
quirement that targets of an investigation voluntarily cooperate in 
building a case against themselves.  Defense attorneys are not the 
partners of the government.  If they were, then the government would 
not need to obtain civil investigative demands for documents, grand 
jury subpoenas for documents and testimony, electronic surveillance, 
or search warrants.214  These powers ensure that the government can 
adequately and effectively investigate wrongdoing and prosecute cul-
pable parties.215  When the government uses these powers to investi-
gate, defense counsel is legally obligated to comply with the govern-
ment’s requests for information. 
Although it is problematic that Stevens represented that she would 
gather documents from outside of GSK but failed to turn them over, 
there is not one case that suggests that an attorney has an obligation 
to turn over documents in response to a voluntary request for infor-
mation.  There is simply no support for the notion that failure to turn 
over documents in response to a voluntary request for information, 
which carries no force of law whatsoever, is actionable.  The govern-
ment’s case would have been much stronger if GSK had documents in 
its possession, received a subpoena that specifically requested those 
documents, failed to turn those documents over to the government, 
and then asserted that the response was complete.  In that situation, 
GSK would have a legal duty to turn over the documents.  In the ab-
sence of a legal duty to turn over documents, there is little justifica-
tion for charging counsel with obstruction of justice for failing to turn 
over the documents. 
2. Prosecutorial Ethics 
Prosecutors have a great deal of discretion in making charging de-
cisions.  In the context of white collar crime, overlapping statutes of-
ten apply to the same conduct.  Thus, prosecutors are expected to use 
 
 213. Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the 
Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Interview with 
United States Attorney James B. Comey Regarding Department of Justice’s Policy 
on Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investigations to Waive the Attorney 
Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 2, 1 (Nov. 2003)). 
 214. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 213, at 1225. 
 215. Id. 
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their discretion ethically when making charging decisions.216  In recent 
years, prosecutors have taken a heightened role in regulating corpo-
rate attorneys by using the criminal law.  The evidence is mounting 
that prosecutors now view legal advice in the course of an internal in-
vestigation as “an obstruction to criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions.”217  That view, however, is inconsistent with the adversarial 
process and the constitutional right to an attorney. 
Prosecutors play a unique role in the judicial system and have spe-
cial ethical rules that apply to their conduct.  But there is little review 
of prosecutorial discretion.  “So long as the prosecutor has probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute,” there is no review of the prosecutor’s decision making.218  
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct instruct prosecutors to “re-
frain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not sup-
ported by probable cause.”219  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, which is 
not binding, instructs prosecutors that “both as a matter of fundamen-
tal fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of jus-
tice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the 
government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by 
an unbiased trier of fact.”220 
Prosecutors must act not only as advocates, but as ministers of jus-
tice as well.221  One important feature of our criminal justice system is 
the notion of the neutral prosecutor, who will select no individual for 
prosecution based on race, national origin, sex, the prosecutor’s per-
sonal feelings about the defendant, or the prosecutor’s potential ca-
reer advancement.222  In this situation, even more than typical 
pretextual prosecutions, there is a heightened danger that the prose-
cutor pursues the case because of animus against opposing counsel.  
 
 216. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in 
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000) (examining areas of pros-
ecutorial discretion and recommending additional education on the exercise of that 
discretion for prosecutors). 
 217. Henning, Targeting, supra note 114, at 694.  
 218. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
 219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2009). 
 220. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.220 cmt. (2011). 
 221. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2009) (explaining that prose-
cutors’ responsibility includes “specific obligations to see that the defendant is ac-
corded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, 
and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of in-
nocent persons.”). 
 222. Bruce Green & Fred Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
837, 886–88 (2004) (reconciling various notions of the neutral prosecutor). 
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As Professor Bruce Green has explained, “the prosecutor’s profes-
sional judgment and detachment are to be trusted least” when he or 
she regulates defense counsel.223  As a result, there is a serious danger 
“of overdeterrence—that is, to avoid the possibility of an unwarrant-
ed prosecution, lawyers may refrain from engaging in lawful conduct 
that is professionally desirable.”224 
The recent prosecutorial trends targeting attorneys as gatekeepers 
and increasing the use of pretextual prosecutions require that prose-
cutors exercise greater care in selecting charges.  It is far too easy for 
prosecutors to base their charging decisions on defense counsel’s fail-
ure to cooperate during an investigation rather than on actual harm 
to the investigation.  An obstruction of justice charge against oppos-
ing counsel should not be an “assertion of government power.”225  As 
Professor Erin Murphy has noted, the difficulty with prosecuting pro-
cess crimes is that “[t]he further a prosecution moves from redressing 
the core prohibitions of process offenses—such as acts that directly 
pervert a function of justice or compromise a collective interest in a 
healthy system—the less firm the moral justification for punish-
ment.”226 Thus, the severity of the obstructive activity must play an 
integral role in determining whether the prosecution is justified. 
The problem is that prosecutors may not judge the harm from the 
obstructive conduct accurately due to tunnel vision.  As Susan 
Brandes notes, “Tunnel vision can be explained as a species of cogni-
tive bias that causes prosecutors to screen out information that might 
cast doubt on the accuracy of their initial version of events.”227  Un-
like street crimes where the prosecutor makes a charging decision af-
ter the police have conducted an investigation, in white collar crime 
cases prosecutors often spend years investigating wrongdoing before 
they ever bring any charges.  After several years dedicated to a par-
ticular case, even a conscientious prosecutor would experience some 
bias in her decision making with respect to that case.228  Research has 
 
 223. Bruce Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 
328–29 (1998). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1536 (2009). 
 226. Murphy, supra note 102, at 1441. 
 227. Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and 
Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 731 
(2011). 
 228. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2006) (“[E]ven ‘virtuous,’ 
‘conscientious,’ and ‘prudent’ prosecutors fall prey to cognitive failures.”); Keith A. 
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shown that once people develop theories, they are unlikely to change 
those theories even when confronted with information that puts the 
accuracy of their theories in doubt.229  Due to this bias, people are 
likely to seek out and “overvalue” information that bolsters their the-
ories and discount any information that weakens their theories.230 
In the Stevens case, the prosecutor decided to pursue Stevens for 
obstruction of justice based on her conduct during the investigation.231  
The prosecutor probably felt confident that Stevens had committed a 
crime.  When the prosecutor viewed the attorney-client privileged 
documents, she was confronted with evidence that Stevens relied on 
the advice of her counsel when responding to the FDA’s inquiry.  If 
Stevens relied on the advice of her counsel, then her actions were 
taken in good faith and were not obstructive.  But that did not dis-
suade the prosecutor from going forward with the charges.  Instead, 
the prosecutor looked for ways to reconcile the evidence “with the ex-
isting theory of guilt.”232  Thus, the prosecutor decided that either 
Stevens did not disclose all of the facts to outside counsel or that it 
was unreasonable for Stevens to rely upon the advice of counsel be-
cause counsel advised her to “make false statements to the FDA and 
to conceal promised documents and information.”233  The prosecu-
tor’s bias was so strong that even the fact that the Maryland U.S. At-
 
Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 319 (2006) (“[T]he longer that . . . prosecutors . . . live 
with a conclusion of guilt, repeating the conclusion and its bases, the more en-
trenched their conclusion becomes, and the more obvious it appears that all evidence 
pointed to that conclusion from the very beginning.”). 
 229. Burke, supra note 228, at 1593. 
 230. Id. (explaining that there are four different aspects of cognitive bias:  “confir-
mation bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance, and the avoidance 
of cognitive dissonance”).  Professor Burke explains that: 
Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek to confirm, rather than discon-
firm, any hypothesis under study. Selective information processing causes 
people to overvalue information that is consistent with their preexisting 
theories and to undervalue information that challenges those theories. Be-
lief perseverance refers to the human tendency to continue to adhere to a 
theory, even after the evidence underlying the theory is disproved. Finally, 
the desire to avoid cognitive dissonance can cause people to adjust their be-
liefs to maintain existing self-perceptions.  
Id. at 1593–94. 
 231. See generally Stevens Indictment, supra note 3 (detailing the allegations of 
wrongdoing against Stevens that occurred during the FDA’s investigation of GSK).   
 232. Burke, supra note 228, at 1606 (“The prosecutor will accept at face value any 
evidence that supports the theory of guilt and will interpret ambiguous evidence in a 
manner that strengthens her faith in the case.”). 
 233.  United States’ Motion to Preclude Advice, supra note 197, at 16.   
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torney refused to sign the indictment due to inadequate evidence did 
not discourage the prosecutor from going forward.234 
In sum, even ethical prosecutors who want to do justice can be sus-
ceptible to bias.  Whether the prosecutors’ bias is conscious or not, 
additional guidance and even restrictions on their discretion when 
considering whether to indict their adversary would enhance ethical 
decision making. 
III.  GOOD FAITH 
The facts of the Lauren Stevens case did not warrant obstruction of 
justice charges.  Nor should prosecutors pursue obstruction of justice 
charges against in-house counsel for these types of disputes in the fu-
ture.  The government clearly pushed the envelope in this situation by 
charging obstruction for actions taken in response to a voluntary re-
quest for information where the company had no legal duty to pro-
duce documents.  Further, charging in-house counsel with obstruction 
for editing a document that the counsel created for the government, 
as opposed to a pre-existing document, was also a novel charge.  That 
is not to say that no situation exists where obstruction of justice 
charges are warranted against in-house counsel for the handling of an 
investigation.  There can be no doubt, however, that prosecuting op-
posing counsel for misconduct during an investigation is a unique sit-
uation that requires special consideration.  This Part argues that the 
government should adopt a good faith standard that advises against 
pursuing criminal charges against opposing counsel for actions taken 
during an internal investigation unless no reasonable attorney could 
find the attorney’s actions acceptable.  This standard is necessary to 
prevent prosecutors from having undue leverage on defense counsel 
during the course of an investigation.  This standard, along with guid-
ance to follow it, should be set forth in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.  
Further, prosecutors should obtain approval before seeking an in-
dictment of an adversary. 
At first blush, good faith may seem like an amorphous standard.  
How does a prosecutor decide whether opposing counsel is acting in 
good faith when the prosecutor disagrees with the decisions that op-
posing counsel made during the investigation?  It is hard for even the 
 
 234. See Sue Reisenger, Why Didn’t the Maryland U.S. Attorney Sign the Lauren 
Stevens Indictment?, CORP. COUNS. (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=1202497751188 (explaining that the Assistant 
U.S. Attorney went forward with the prosecution despite the objection of the Mary-
land U.S. Attorney). 
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fairest and most reasonable prosecutor to break away from the tunnel 
vision that inevitably develops during an investigation that spans sev-
eral years.  Certainly the prosecutors in the Lauren Stevens case 
forcefully argued that she did not act in good faith and was thus not 
entitled to the obstruction of justice safe harbor for attorneys or an 
advice of counsel defense.  Those arguments, however, came after the 
indictment.  What is missing is an objective assessment of an attor-
ney’s good faith before the government pursues obstruction of justice 
charges against opposing counsel. 
Before pursuing an indictment against opposing counsel for ob-
struction of justice or other charges for actions taken in the course of 
an investigation, the question for the prosecutor should be whether 
the attorney acted in good faith representation of the client.  In other 
words, would no reasonable attorney find the attorney’s actions ac-
ceptable?  Does the attorney have honest or bad intentions?  Im-
portantly, one cannot judge good faith by the end result; one must 
judge the attorney’s intentions at the time that he took the action at 
issue.  For example, if the prosecutor and defense counsel end up in 
court arguing about the appropriate response to a subpoena or civil 
investigative demand and the judge rules in favor of the prosecutor, 
that ruling should not be the basis for obstruction of justice charges 
unless some other showing of bad faith has been made.  There has to 
be room for disagreement between the prosecution and defense 
based on arguments supported by the law.  To find otherwise would 
destroy the adversarial process and exponentially increase the lever-
age that prosecutors already have over corporations and their coun-
sel. 
Because it is impossible to set forth every scenario that could occur 
between the prosecution and defense and make a determination of 
whether defense counsel acted in good or bad faith, the best course is 
for the DOJ to update the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to include guid-
ance on when to pursue obstruction of justice or other charges against 
opposing counsel for actions taken during an investigation.  The DOJ 
should provide factors for prosecutors to consider when deciding 
whether to seek an indictment against defense counsel.  In addition to 
providing guidance to prosecutors, the DOJ should also require pros-
ecutors to obtain approval from a superior who is not involved in the 
case before seeking an indictment. 
The prosecutors should weigh all of the factors that they normally 
consider when deciding whether to indict an individual, such as the 
sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of success at trial; the prob-
able deterrent, rehabilitative, and other consequences of conviction; 
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and the adequacy of noncriminal approaches.235  Due to the nature of 
the adversarial relationship between prosecutors and corporate attor-
neys, however, some additional considerations should come into play 
in deciding the appropriateness of the charges.  In particular, due to 
the concern that zealous advocacy will be chilled by these types of 
prosecutions, it is important that the government consider whether 
the actions that are the subject of the charge were taken in good faith 
representation of the client. 
There are many factors that may be relevant to a finding of good 
faith representation.  A key issue will be the stage of the investigation 
where the alleged misconduct took place.  If it took place in an early 
stage, such as during an agency’s voluntary request for information, it 
is not easy to justify a prosecution because there is no legal duty to re-
spond to a voluntary request for information.  The only duty that de-
fense counsel has at that point in the investigation is the duty of loyal-
ty to her client.  Thus, unless the client directs the attorney to fully 
cooperate with the government’s investigation, turn over incriminat-
ing documents, and hope for leniency, defense counsel will be moti-
vated to resist turning over any incriminating documents.  Further, 
counsel might also advise the employees of the corporation not to 
speak with government investigators.  If the attorney’s actions are le-
gal and she believes they are in the best interests of the client, her 
conduct should not be the basis of obstruction of justice charges. 
Defense counsel’s obligation to turn over documents, however, in-
creases as they progress in the investigative process.236  Thus, if the 
government has obtained a civil investigative demand or a grand jury 
subpoena, defense counsel has a legal obligation to turn over docu-
ments.237  That does not mean, however, that any dispute over the ap-
propriate scope of that response should lead to obstruction of justice 
charges.  Nor should a motion to quash a subpoena based on valid le-
gal arguments give rise to obstruction of justice charges.  As previous-
ly mentioned, defense counsel will read subpoenas and civil investiga-
tive demands narrowly and only produce what they absolutely must 
produce to comply with the company’s legal obligation.238  They do 
 
 235. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-27.230, 250 (2011). 
 236. While counsel may not have a legal obligation to turn over documents in re-
sponse to a voluntary request for information, if the investigation proceeds to a grand 
jury and an indictment is issued, counsel must comply. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g) (ex-
plaining that an individual who fails to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena will be 
held in contempt of court). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
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not have an obligation to volunteer to turn over incriminating docu-
ments that are not requested in the subpoena or civil investigative 
demand.  The government, on the other hand, will read the requests 
broadly and may view the withholding of documents for privilege or 
non-responsiveness as obstructing the investigation.  This is particu-
larly true if the prosecutor is already predisposed to hostility toward 
the attorney-client privilege because of a belief that the corporation 
may be using the privilege to protect documents that would otherwise 
be discoverable.  These types of disputes over the scope of the re-
sponse to a civil investigative demand or subpoena should not result 
in obstruction of justice charges unless no reasonable attorney would 
interpret the document request in the manner that defense counsel 
interpreted it.  On the other hand, if defense counsel is instructing 
employees to route e-mails through the in-house legal department to 
shield incriminating documents from discovery or destroying docu-
ments that the government might request or has already requested, it 
is unlikely that those actions are taken in good faith. 
Another important factor to consider in a good faith determination 
is whether the attorney was involved in the misconduct or had direct 
responsibility for preventing the misconduct.  If the attorney bears re-
sponsibility for the conduct that the government is investigating, the 
government should rightly question whether the attorney’s actions 
are self-serving to protect her from criminal charges.  In that situa-
tion, the attorney’s actions are not taken in the good faith representa-
tion of the client. 
Additionally, the government should heavily scrutinize a potential 
prosecution that is based on defense counsel’s statements in the 
course of the investigation.  In the Stevens case, the government pur-
sued false statement and obstruction of justice charges because Ste-
vens sent a letter saying that the production of documents was com-
plete and that “GSK has not developed, devised, established, or 
maintained any program or activity to promote or encourage, either 
directly or indirectly, the use of Wellbutrin SR as a means to achieve 
weight loss or treat obesity.”239  Even if the government does not 
agree with those types of assertions or finds them misleading, the 
government should not pursue an indictment unless the statements 
actually had some impact on the investigation.  It is tough to assert 
that opposing counsel’s legal conclusion about the legality of its cli-
ent’s conduct amounts to false statements or obstruction of justice.  
 
 239. Stevens Indictment, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
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These are not the types of statements that the government would rely 
on when deciding what steps to take in its investigation.  The gov-
ernment would investigate the facts for itself before accepting oppos-
ing counsel’s legal conclusion about the merits of the potential case 
against her client.  To pretend that opposing counsel’s assertion that 
her client’s actions were legal will alter, let alone obstruct, a govern-
ment investigation in any way is disingenuous.  The government will 
come to its own conclusion about the legality of the conduct after it 
reviews all of the facts.  In short, the government needs to consider 
whether the statements that they believe are false or obstructive are 
advocacy, legal conclusions, or statements of fact. 
Finally, if the government is considering charging in-house counsel 
with covering up a client’s crime, the government should consider 
whether there is ample evidence to support criminal charges against 
the client.  As a matter of fundamental fairness, it is mind-boggling 
that an attorney can be convicted for covering up a client’s crime 
when the government has not proven that the client committed a 
crime.  An attorney who had no involvement in the alleged miscon-
duct does not act in bad faith when she vigorously defends her client 
throughout the investigation.240  A vigorous defense should not be la-
beled obstruction. 
The DOJ should also institute a requirement that Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys must receive approval before bringing charges against a 
corporate attorney for obstruction of justice or other charges arising 
from an investigation.  When the DOJ operated under the factors that 
the McNulty Memorandum mandated be considered when charging 
corporations, prosecutors could not ask a corporation to waive the at-
torney-client privilege before certain requirements were met.241  In 
particular, the McNulty Memorandum required prosecutors to “ob-
tain written authorization from the United States Attorney who must 
provide a copy of the request to, and consult with, the Assistant At-
torney General for the Criminal Division before granting or denying 
the request.”242  Because of the possibility of prosecutorial overreach-
ing in this area, it seems appropriate to have this type of approval re-
quirement before a prosecutor can criminally charge opposing coun-
sel for actions taken during the course of an investigation.  Further, 
 
 240. Henning, Targeting, supra note 114, at 680–84 (explaining that obstruction of 
justice charges have been brought against attorneys who have crossed the line from 
representing their clients to acting in concert with their client’s wrongdoing). 
 241. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 118, at 8–11. 
 242. Id. at 9.  
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following approval of the charges there should be a determination as 
to whether the U.S. Attorney who was involved in the investigation 
should spearhead the prosecution.  This requirement will help to pre-
serve the appearance of impartiality.  These approval requirements 
would have prevented the Stevens trial because the Maryland U.S. 
Attorney did not approve the indictment.   
Some may argue that a pre-indictment determination of good faith 
is unnecessary because attorneys can raise good faith at trial.  Alter-
natively, one may argue that requiring a pre-indictment determina-
tion of good faith is an undue hardship on the prosecutor.  Both of 
those arguments are without merit.  Prosecutors are obligated to seek 
justice, not to pursue adversaries who got the best of them during an 
investigation.243  Thus, requiring the prosecutor to examine whether 
the attorney acted in good faith and obtain permission to seek an in-
dictment ensures objectivity and helps to satisfy the prosecutor’s duty 
to seek justice.  It is not an undue burden.  It is a necessary step to 
safeguard the adversarial system of justice and preserve limited gov-
ernment resources.  There are already some situations that require 
the prosecutor to obtain approval before prosecuting attorneys.244  If 
obtaining approval in those cases is not an undue burden, then it is 
unlikely to be an undue burden in this case.  Further, by the time the 
opportunity arises for an attorney to defend herself at trial based on 
good faith, she will have already encountered the expense and hard-
ship of a trial, lost her livelihood, and seen her name dragged through 
the mud.  The extra steps are justified to ensure that attorneys do not 
suffer these consequences when they act in good faith. 
The purpose of this proposal is not to give defense attorneys free 
rein to engage in obstructive conduct during an investigation.  Rather, 
the purpose is to permit attorneys to zealously represent their clients’ 
interests during an investigation without the fear that success may 
mean charges against the attorney.  The alternative, which is to leave 
 
 243. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010). 
 244. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-2.032.  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual re-
quires notification to the criminal division whenever a U.S. Attorney is considering 
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of a loss of “impartiality” in the prosecution. Id.  
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these charging decisions in the hands of individual prosecutors, cre-
ates too much potential for abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
The Stevens prosecution was a perfect storm in which several pros-
ecution trends converged.  The government’s push to hold corporate 
officers and attorneys responsible for misconduct within the corpora-
tion put the eye of the storm squarely on Stevens.  Stevens could be 
seen as a corporate officer or gatekeeper who was responsible for en-
forcing integrity in drug promotion.  The government’s long standing 
hostility to the corporate attorney-client privilege and the efficiency 
of pursuing pretextual prosecutions provided the perfect strategy for 
obtaining a conviction. Even though the government did not succeed 
in the Stevens case, there is still the danger that these trends will meet 
again and convince a prosecutor to pursue  another in-house counsel. 
Judge Titus is correct.245  When a corporation asks its in-house 
counsel to respond to a government request for information and in-
house counsel makes decisions with which the government does not 
agree, that should not permit the government to pierce the corporate 
attorney-client privilege by invoking the crime-fraud exception.246  It 
is not a crime or fraud for a corporation to seek legal representation 
when under government investigation.  It does not turn into a crime 
or fraud because the government does not agree with the choices de-
fense counsel makes in response to the government’s inquiry.  When 
there is no evidence that the client wanted the attorney to cover up 
his or her prior crimes, there is no evidence that the client hired the 
attorney to help the client commit a crime or fraud.  Thus, clients 
should not fear that their confidences will be violated simply because 
their attorney mounts a vigorous defense on their behalf. A vigorous 
defense is not a cover-up.  Prosecutors and defense lawyers will al-
ways have disputes over the production of documents.  So long as de-
fense counsel acts in good faith when responding to a government in-
quiry on behalf of a corporation, the attorney should not fear 
prosecution for her advice. 
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